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SCHOOLYARD: LOWER COURTS
DISMISSAL OF PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX IS
ESPECIALLY FAILING OUR STUDENTS IN
THE “#METOO” WORLD
CHRISTINE TAMER†
INTRODUCTION
While the term #MeToo was first coined in 2006, the
movement came to the forefront of American life in October 2017
when actress Alyssa Milano tweeted, “if you’ve been sexually
harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.”1
Since then, the #MeToo movement has exposed the fact that
sexual harassment remains all too common and has pushed for
change in the legal procedures that have failed victims.2 In the
#MeToo world, sexual harassment is “finally getting the public
attention it has long deserved” and the public has come together
to deem it—in one word—unacceptable.3
While much of the #MeToo movement has focused on
workplace sexual harassment,4 less attention has been paid to
sexual harassment in schools, where—even in the #MeToo world—
sexual harassment remains the norm.5
Although “silence
break[ing]” is the theme of the #MeToo movement,6 when child
victims of peer sexual harassment speak up, lower courts are
†
Assistant Professor of Law and the Director of Legal Writing at UNT Dallas
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1
Elliott v. Donegan, 469 F. Supp. 3d 40, 51–52 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2020).
2
See generally Jessica A. Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 37
(2019).
3
Brian Soucek & Vicki Schultz, Sexual Harassment by Any Other Name, 2019 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 227, 228 (2019).
4
See, e.g., Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men.
Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html.
5
See infra notes 37–49.
6
Stephanie Zacharek et al., The Silence Breakers, TIME (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/
[https://perma.cc/YK4M-M4TY].
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silencing their voices before they even reach a jury. An analysis of
174 cases involving Title IX peer sexual harassment from the past
three years (2017 to 2020) revealed that 58.6% of cases (102 out of
174) were dismissed at the motion to dismiss or summary
judgment stage.7 While summary judgment is appropriate only
where the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as
a matter of law,”8 over the last three years, an astonishing 77.1%
(64 out of 83) of motions for summary judgment were granted in
cases involving Title IX peer-to-peer harassment.9 Similarly,
while a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is viewed with disfavor and is
rarely granted,”10 in just the last three years, 41.7% (38 out of 91)
of these motions were granted in Title IX peer-to-peer harassment
cases.11
The Title IX cases being dismissed in the #MeToo era are
hardly frivolous.
For example, courts are holding that—
supposedly taking “all well-pleaded facts as true [and] viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff”12—a male middle
school student threatening to tie up a female classmate in his
basement, staring at her in class and making animal noises, and
calling her a “bitch” is insufficient to even state a claim for
harassment on the basis of sex.13 Courts are holding that—
supposedly taking “all well-pleaded facts as true [and] viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s]”14—a male
middle school student’s “name-calling, verbal and physical
harassment, sexual harassment, and physical pushing, shoving
and elbowing in the school halls, during class, at recess, and on the
bus” and a threat to “tie the girls up and rape them” is insufficient
to state a claim for “severe [and] pervasive” harassment.15 These
7

A search was conducted on Westlaw for cases between January 1, 2017, and
December 31, 2020, that cited Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Edu.,
526 U.S. 629 (1999) and involved Title IX claims for peer-to-peer harassment. A case
list is on file with author.
8
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
9
See supra note 7.
10
Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harrington v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009)).
11
See supra note 7.
12
Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2016)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
13
Diebold v. Hartford Pub. Sch., No. 1:15-CV-529, 2017 WL 4512575, at *1–*2, *6
(W.D. Mich. May 25, 2017).
14
Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C., 819 F.3d at 174 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
15
Feucht v. Triad Loc. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 425 F. Supp. 3d 918, 931 (S.D. Ohio
2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-4270, 2020 WL 3498112 (6th Cir. May 20, 2020).

2021] WATERCOOLER IS SAFER THAN THE SCHOOLYARD

795

are not cases from the early 2000s. These two examples are from
2017, that is, the year of Harvey Weinstein’s downfall.16 Before
dismissing victims’ cases, courts often couch their opinions in
language like the following: “While this Court certainly does not
want to downplay the vile threat that male students allegedly
made toward [the victim] and her friend that they ‘would tie the
girls up and rape them . . . .’ ”17 However, by holding such facts do
not even warrant a jury determination, courts are doing just that:
downplaying the vile sexual harassment students are enduring at
school. The question is, then, does Title IX require courts to grant
dismissals and summary judgments so freely?
In Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of
Education, the Supreme Court of the United States made a
conscious decision to make schoolyards less safe than the
workplace when it came to peer-to-peer sexual harassment by
providing schools with an almost impenetrable shield against
liability.18 Under Davis, a school district will not be liable to a
student-plaintiff under Title IX unless: (1) the plaintiff was
harassed “on the basis of [sex]”; (2) the harassment was “so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive
the victims of access to educational opportunities or benefits
provided by the school”; and (3) the school had “actual knowledge”
of the harassment but stayed “deliberately indifferent” to it.19
Incredibly, however, at the motion to dismiss and summary
judgment stage, lower courts are applying this already high
standard to make it even higher than Davis requires and miles
above what is required in the workplace under Title VII. This has
had the effect of literally dismissing sexual harassment in schools
through motions to dismiss and summary judgment and, thereby,
not only normalizing sexual harassment in schools, but also
making sexual harassment that would be deemed unacceptable in
the workplace seemingly acceptable in schools. This Article
identifies three big problem areas in the lower courts’
interpretation of Davis at the dismissal and summary judgment
stage; compares the courts treatment of adult victims of workplace
sexual harassment under Title VII to children victims of peer

16
Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid off Sexual Harassment
Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10
/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html.
17
Feucht, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 931.
18
526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
19
Id. at 650.
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sexual harassment at schools under Title IX; and offers solutions
for how courts should approach Title IX peer-to-peer harassment
cases at the pre-trial stage without diverging from Davis.
The first big problem that is leading to dismissal of victims’
cases is that some lower courts are holding that, in order to satisfy
the “on the basis of sex” element under Title IX, student-plaintiffs
must prove the subjective intent of the student harasser, who is
often a young child.20 Courts are questioning whether these young
child harassers—as a matter of law—have enough “sexual
awareness” to ever meet this element,21 which is completely
contrary to Title VII’s “because of sex” requirement that has been
held uniformly not to require evidence of a harasser’s motivation.22
While Title VII’s “because of sex” requirement should be “treated
interchangeably” with Title IX’s “on the basis of sex”
requirement,23 courts are misinterpreting Title IX’s “on the basis
of sex” element to wrongly excuse the relevant actor—the school
district—from addressing sexual harassment in its halls based on
the subjective sexual awareness, or unawareness, of a child. This
has the effect of causing children to “tolerate” sexual conduct in
schools that would be deemed unacceptable had it taken place in
an adult workplace.24
The second major problem is that lower courts are granting
dismissal on the harassers conduct and/or the victim’s injury,
holding that the harassment at issue was not “severe and
pervasive” enough, or that the injury the victim suffered from was
insufficient to deprive her of educational opportunities or benefits
provided by the school.25 By granting dismissal or summary
judgment with respect to the student harassers’ conduct, courts
send the message that such sexual conduct—despite being
offensive, vile, and awful—is not an “actionable” act of sexual
harassment and, accordingly, the school district is not required to
address it. 26 But, arguably the most problematic is lower courts

20

See infra Section III.A.1.
Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, IL. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 821
(7th Cir. 2003) (questioning “whether a five or six year old kindergartner can ever engage
in conduct constituting ‘sexual harassment’ or ‘gender discrimination’ under Title IX”).
22
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 278 (3d Cir. 2001).
23
Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 866 (8th Cir. 2011).
24
See infra Section III.A.2.
25
See infra Section III.B.
26
See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ. 526 U.S. 629, 651–
52 (1999).
21
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granting dismissal on the victim’s injury.27 In contrast to the
workplace, where an employee is not required to show a certain
amount of suffering to survive summary judgment under Title VII,
lower courts applying Title IX are holding that child victims did
not suffer enough—or failed to articulate their suffering enough—
to proceed to a trial.28 Davis does not require this outcome and,
rather, dismissing a victims’ Title IX cause of action because the
victim was resilient and managed to overcome the sexual
harassment, “turns Title IX on its head.”29
The third major problem is that lower courts are improperly
construing Davis to hold that deliberate indifference is only met
when a school does nothing—that is, the facts of Davis—and,
thereby, making schools not only immune from liability but also
excusing schools from protecting students from extremely hostile
situations.30 This Article argues that courts must stop employing
the facts of Davis “as the barometer for deliberate indifference”
and suggests three well-settled definitions of what is “clearly
unreasonable” or, rather, “clearly unreasonable” enough to require
a jury to decide the issue of deliberate indifference.31
Finally, this Article discusses the recent deepening circuit
split32 that began in 2019 over whether Davis requires a studentplaintiff to show that a school’s deliberate indifference “caused him
to experience any separate harassment following his assault.”33 In
Farmer v. Kansas State University, the Tenth Circuit held that
“[p]laintiffs can state a viable Title IX claim for student-on-student
harassment by alleging that the funding recipient’s deliberate
indifference caused them to be ‘vulnerable to’ further harassment
27
See infra Section III.B.3.b; see also Grayson Sang Walker, Note, The Evolution
and Limits of Title IX Doctrine on Peer Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95,
112 (2010) (describing the “disturbing trends in post-Davis litigation” of questioning
victim’s allegations at the dismissal and summary judgment stage).
28
See Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1994) (Title VII
protects workers “who possess[ ] the dedication and fortitude to complete [their]
assigned tasks even in the face of offensive and abusive sexual banter.”); see also
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
29
Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 706 (4th Cir. 2007) (Gregory, J.,
concurring).
30
See infra Part IV.
31
Foster v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., 982 F.3d 960, 981, 981 n.8 (6th Cir.
2020) (Moore, J., dissenting).
32
Compare Farmer v. Kan. State Univ., 918 F.3d 1094, 1104 (10th Cir. 2019),
with K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2017), and
Kollaritsch v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 944 F.3d 613, 619–20 (6th Cir. 2019).
33
See infra Section V; Rossley v. Drake Univ., 342 F. Supp. 3d 904, 930 (S.D. Iowa
2018).
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without requiring an allegation of subsequent actual sexual
harassment.”34 In contrast, the Eight and Sixth Circuits have
recently interrupted Davis to require that a school’s purported
deliberate indifference following the actionable sexual harassment
cause the student to suffer from additional, subsequent actionable
harassment.35 This Article argues that the Tenth Circuit approach
is the right one and addresses how the Eighth and Sixth Circuits’
requirement of further actionable harassment effectively adopts a
“one free rape” rule in the context of peer sexual harassment,
which not only runs counter to Davis and the goals of Title IX, but
should be deemed particularly unacceptable in the #MeToo
world.36
This Article has five parts. Part I explores the current
problem of sexual harassment in K-12 schools and how the
Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX, as contrasted with Title
VII, to make the schoolyard far less safe than the watercooler.
Part II analyzes how lower courts are overusing dismissal and
summary judgment in the context of peer sexual harassment.
Specifically, Part II analyzes how even within the last three
years—since Harvey Weinstein and the emergence of the #MeToo
movement—lower courts have overwhelmingly dismissed cases of
peer sexual harassment at the motion to dismiss or summary
judgment stage. Part III argues that lower courts are applying
Davis too strictly, especially at the motion to dismiss and
summary judgment stage, and, as a result, the schoolyard has
become far less safe than the watercooler. Part III compares how
lower courts have applied the “on the basis of sex,” “severe and
pervasive,” and injury elements of a peer harassment claim under
Title IX versus Title VII to normalize sexual harassment in
schools. Additionally, Part III addresses how courts—within the
Davis framework—should approach motions for dismissal or
summary judgment in Title IX peer sexual harassment cases. Part
IV discusses the deliberate indifference standard and how—
without diverging from Davis—it can be interpreted to better hold
34

Farmer, 918 F.3d at 1104.
K.T., 865 F.3d at 1058; Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 619–20.
36
Spencer v. Univ. of N.M. Bd. of Regents, No. 15-CV-141 MCA/SCY, 2016 WL
10592223, at *6 (D.N.M. Jan. 11, 2016) (quoting S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 741
(Wash. Ct. App. 2008); see also Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. 3:01-CV-1591, 2003 WL
1563424, at *3 (D. Conn. 2003) (“[A] reasonable jury [may] conclude that further
encounters, of any sort, between a rape victim and her attacker could create an
environment sufficiently hostile to deprive the victim of access to educational
opportunities provided by a university.”).
35
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schools accountable. Part V discusses the recent circuit split that
threatens to raise the bar—even higher than it already is—for
recovering under Title IX for peer harassment, which would
effectively foreclose the remedy for student victims and further
immunize schools from liability.
I. SUPREME COURT MAKES THE SCHOOLYARD LESS SAFE THAN
THE WATERCOOLER
Within a year after the seminal Title IX case Davis was
decided, 2,064 public school students between eighth and eleventh
grade were surveyed regarding their experience with sexual
harassment at school.37 Of the students surveyed, 81% of them
responded that they had experienced sexual harassment in schools
at least once—with girls reporting sexual harassment more
frequently than boys (83% compared to 78%).38 The survey
concluded that “sexual harassment [was] widespread in school
life” and that “[b]ecause of the widespread nature of sexual
harassment in school life, some students report[ed] that it [was
not] a big deal and many accept[ed] it as part of everyday life.”39
Today, sexual harassment remains a major issue in schools
and because of Davis—and particularly the lower courts’ overly
strict interpretation of Davis—students are still being forced to
“accept [sexual harassment] as part of everyday life” in schools.40
In their most recent survey, the American Association of
University Women found that sexual harassment was “part of
everyday life in middle and high schools” with 48% of students
reporting that they had experienced sexual harassment in the
2010–2011 school year and 87% of students saying such
harassment had a negative effect of on them.41 Students
frequently experienced both sexual harassment in person and
through electronic means, with girls experiencing sexual
harassment more than boys.42 The majority of harassed students
37

JODI LIPSON, AM. ASS’N UNIV. WOMEN, HOSTILE HALLWAYS: BULLYING,
TEASING,
AND
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
IN
SCHOOL
9
(May
2001),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED454132.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW7U-JLGG].
38
Id. at 13.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
CATHERINE HILL & HOLLY KEARL, AM. ASS’N UNIV. WOMEN, CROSSING THE
LINE:
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
AT
SCHOOL
2
(Nov.
2011),
https://www.aauw.org/app/uploads/2020/03/Crossing-the-Line-Sexual-Harassmentat-School.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL63-MRXH].
42
Id. at 11.
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reported that their harasser was a male peer (54%) or a group of
male peers (12%).43 Of the students who responded that they were
sexually harassed, 50% of them “did nothing about it,” and only
9% of them reported it to an adult at school.44 Indeed, sexual
harassment and assault by peers in schools is far more common
than that by teachers. An Associated Press survey found that for
every one adult sexual attack on a minor student, there are seven
peer-to-peer sexual attacks.45 In a study from fall 2011 to spring
2015, there were 17,000 reports of peer-to-peer sexual assault.46
Since the #MeToo movement began in 2017, there has been
an increase in reported sexual assaults in primary and secondary
schools.47 The Department of Education found that reports of
sexual violence at K-12 schools rose by 55% between the 2015–
2016 and 2017–2018 school year.48
Furthermore, sexual
harassment complaints from K-12 schools were nearly 15 times
greater in 2019 than 2009.49 It is unclear whether this increase
was because sexual assault and harassment itself has increased or
because students are more likely to report it as a result of the
#MeToo movement.50
Despite the huge problem of sexual harassment in schools and
the similarity between Title VII and Title IX, the Supreme Court
explicitly chose to make children at schools less protected from
sexual harassment than adults in the workplace.
A.

Title VII vs. Title IX

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is where the doctrine
of sexual harassment originated. Title VII makes it “an unlawful
43

Id. at 13.
Id. at 27.
45
Robin McDowell et al., Hidden Horror of School Sexual Assaults Revealed by
AP, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 1, 2017), https://www.ap.org/explore/schoolhouse-sexassault/hidden-horror-of-school-sex-assaults-revealed-by-ap.html
[https://perma.cc/EXA2-NHDN].
46
Id. It is important to note that this is likely only a small fraction of the actual
number of such assaults due to underreporting and a lack of tracking.
47
Héctor Alejandro Arzate, Why the Increase in Sexual Assaults Reported by
Schools?, EDUC. WEEK (July 29, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/leadership/why-theincrease-in-sexual-assaults-reported-by-schools/2019/07
[https://perma.cc/UY5LGQHN].
48
OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP’T OF EDUC., SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN K-12 SCHOOLS
(Oct. 2020), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexual-violence.pdf
?utm_content=&utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_source=govdelivery&utm_t
erm= [https://perma.cc/AV3B-ZLNP].
49
Id.
50
Arzate, supra note 47.
44
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employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”51 Title IX
of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 provides:52 “No person
. . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”53
Title IX is largely modeled after Title VII, however, there are
key differences. First, Title VII provides an express cause of
action,54 whereas Title IX’s private cause of action is recognized as
an implied right by the courts.55 Second, Title VII is an “outright
prohibition” that “applies to all employers without regard to
federal funding,”56 whereas Title IX only applies to recipients of
federal education funding and is a condition of those federal
funds.57 Additionally, the aim of Title VII is to broadly “eradicat[e]
discrimination throughout the economy” and “make persons whole
for injuries suffered through past discrimination,”58 whereas Title
IX “focuses more on ‘protecting’ individuals from discriminatory
practices carried out by recipients of federal funds.”59
B.

Title VII Hostile Environment Harassment

In 1986, the Supreme Court interpreted the word “sex” in Title
VII to include sexual harassment and recognized two forms of
sexual harassment claims: (1) quid pro quo claims and (2) hostile
environment claims.60 A quid pro quo claim arises when an
employer demands an employee perform sexual favors in return
for some job benefit.61 A hostile environment claim—the relevant
51

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (WL current through P.L. 112-283, Jan. 15, 2013).
See, e.g., Adele P. Kimmel, Title IX: An Imperfect but Vital Tool to Stop Bullying
of LGBT Students, 125 YALE L.J. 2006 (2016); R. Kent Piacenti, Toward a Meaningful
Response to the Problem of Anti-Gay Bullying in American Public Schools, 19 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 58, 63 (2011).
53
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
54
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f).
55
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979).
56
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998).
57
See id. at 286–87.
58
Id. (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254 (1994)).
59
Id. at 287.
60
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–66 (1986).
61
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998) (“Cases based on
threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct
52
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claim for purposes of this Article—occurs when the harassment is
so “severe or pervasive [as] ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s]
employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ”62 To
establish a prima facie case for hostile work environment against
an employer, a plaintiff must prove: (1) she/he is a member of a
protected class; (2) she/he was the subject of unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) the harassment occurred because of her/his sex;
(4) the sexual harassment “ha[d] the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment”; and (5) a basis to hold the employer liable.63
Because Title VII holds the employer liable—that is, not the
individual harasser—the test for employer liability differs
depending on whether the harassment is at the hands of a
supervisor or non-supervisor (for example, coworker peers). When
a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate, an employer is
vicariously liable for the acts of the supervisor under agency
principles.64 However, when the harassment is by a coworker
(non-supervisor), agency principles do not apply. Rather, the
employer is liable for its own actions under a negligence standard,
which requires the plaintiff to show the “employer either knew
(actual notice) or should have known (constructive notice) of the
harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action.”65 Actual notice requires that “management
knew of the harassment,” whereas constructive notice can be
established “when the harassment [is] so severe and pervasive
that management . . . should have known.”66 “If an employer has
actual or constructive notice of harassment but takes immediate
and appropriate corrective action, the employer is not liable for the
harassment.”67

from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive
to create a hostile work environment. The terms quid pro quo and hostile work
environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in
which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are absent altogether,
but beyond this are of limited utility.”).
62
Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
63
Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d
1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999); Breda v. Wolf Camera & Video, 222 F.3d 886, 889 n.3
(11th Cir. 2000).
64
Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 765.
65
Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1261.
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In explaining what kind of sexual harassment is actionable
under Title VII, the Supreme Court clarified that for conduct to
meet the standard of “hostile work environment,” it must be
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter . . . conditions of [the
victim’s] employment and create . . . [an] abusive working
environment.”68 To make this determination, the Court stated it
would look at the totality of the circumstances, which “may include
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.”69 The Court explained that the
challenged conduct need not “seriously affect [the] employees’
psychological well-being” and that “Title VII comes into play before
the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.”70 The
plaintiff is not required to show the complained conduct caused
her work to be impaired or that “tangible productivity declined”;
rather, the plaintiff need only prove her/his “working conditions
have been discriminatorily altered.”71 In addition, the Court
explained that when determining whether conduct constitutes
harassment under a “hostile environment theory,” it must: “(1) be
viewed subjectively as harassment by the victim and (2) be
objectively severe or pervasive enough that a reasonable person
would agree that it is harassment.”72

68

Id. at 1257.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
70
Id. at 22.
71
Id. at 25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he test is not whether work has been
impaired, but whether working conditions have been discriminatorily altered.”); Id.
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“ ‘[T]he plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible
productivity has declined as a result of the harassment.’ It suffices to prove that a
reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff
did, that the harassment so altered working conditions as to ‘ma[k]e it more difficult
to do the job.’ ”) (citing Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir.
1988)).
72
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”).
69
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Hostile Environment Harassment Under Title IX: Supreme
Court Makes Children Much Less Protected from Extremely
Hostile School Environments than Adults are from Hostile
Workplaces

Similar to an employee’s cause of action against an employer
for “hostile environment” harassment under Title VII, the
Supreme Court has held a public school student has a cause of
action against a school for “hostile environment” harassment.73
Similar to Title VII, where an employer can be liable via a hostile
environment claim to a plaintiff-employee for sexual harassment
committed by the plaintiff’s supervisor or co-worker, a public
school can be liable via a hostile environment claim to a plaintiffstudent for sexual harassment committed by a school official—
teacher, coach, and staff—or a fellow student.74 However,
although relying on Title VII case law, the Supreme Court
explicitly refused to use Title VII liability standards in its Title IX
analysis.75 Rather, Supreme Court precedent has made clear that
students in school would be less protected that adults in their
workplace.
1.

Gebser: The Supreme Court Raises the Bar for Imposing
Liability Beyond That in Title VII in the Context of TeacherStudent Sexual Harassment Under Title IX

In Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public Schools, the Supreme
Court, applying Title VII case law, held that a private cause of
action for monetary damages existed for sexual harassment under
Title IX.76 In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the
Court defined the parameters of a Title IX private action and
answered “when a school district may be held liable in damages in
an implied right of action under Title IX” for teacher-student
sexual harassment.77 The plaintiff Gebser, comparing supervisoremployee sexual harassment to teacher-student sexual
harassment, had argued that the Court should apply Title VII
hostile workplace standards to Title IX; the Supreme Court,

73
See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 637
(1999); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1992).
74
See Davis, 526 U.S. at 637; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74–75.
75
See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283–85 (1998)
(holding, in a case of teacher-student sexual harassment that Title VII’s agency
principles did not apply to Title IX); Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.
76
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75–76.
77
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
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however, rejected that argument.78 Contrary to Title VII, where
employers are held liable under principles of agency for supervisor
harassment, the Court refused to hold school districts similarly
liable, reasoning that “it would ‘frustrate the purposes’ of Title IX
to permit a [monetary] damages recovery against a school district
for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student based on principles
of respondeat superior or constructive notice.”79 The Court
reasoned that, unlike Title VII, which defines “employer” to
expressly include its agents, Title IX does not reference agents of
a school district.80
Moreover, the Court in refusing to adopt Title VII standards,
held that the statutes had two different purposes: while Title VII
is intended to punish acts of discrimination, “Title IX focuses more
on ‘protecting’ individuals from discriminatory practices carried
out by recipients of federal funds.”81 As summarized by the Third
Circuit: “The explicit cause of action in Title VII is intended to
punish acts of discrimination, whereas the cause of action in Title
IX is intended as protection for the student.” 82 The Court thus
held that, unlike Title VII, which contains an “outright
prohibition” of sexual discrimination, Tile IX’s prohibition of
sexual harassment and discrimination is a “condition” to the
award of federal funds.83 Therefore, the Court held that an implied
right of private action, if it were modeled after Title VII agency
principles, would improperly interfere with a school district’s
“opportunity for voluntary compliance” and the administrative
remedies included in Title IX.84 Accordingly, the Court held that
a school district must have “notice to an ‘appropriate person’ and
an opportunity to rectify any violation” before damages may be
imposed.85 The Court, thus, held that in order for a student to
recover damages under Title IX for sexual harassment by a
teacher, the student must prove that an “appropriate” school
official with “authority to take corrective action to end the
discrimination” had actual knowledge of the harassing conduct but

78

Id. at 285.
Id.
80
Id. at 283.
81
Id. at 287.
82
Warren ex rel. Good v. Reading Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2002)
(summarizing Gebser).
83
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286–87.
84
Id. at 289.
85
Id. at 290.
79
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acted with “deliberate indifference” in his or her actions “not to
remedy the violation.”86
2.

Davis: The Supreme Court Raises the Bar Even Higher for
Imposing Liability in the Context of Peer-to-Peer Sexual
Harassment Under Title IX

With respect to student-on-student sexual harassment, the
seminal case is Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board
of Education, where the Supreme Court held that students subject
to peer-to-peer sex-based harassment may sue the school district
for damages and set forth what is required for a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case.87 In Davis, the plaintiff was the
mother of a fifth grade student, LaShonda, who had been the
victim of prolonged sexual harassment at her elementary school
by one of her classmates, G.F.88 The plaintiff alleged that G.F.
“attempted to touch LaShonda’s breasts and genital area” while
making “vulgar statements such as ‘I want to go to bed with
you.’ ”89 In one incident, G.F. put a doorstop in his pants and
“act[ed] in a sexually suggestive manner toward LaShonda.”90 In
another incident, G.F. “rubbed his body against [her] in the school
hallway.” 91 Each time LaShonda would report the incident to her
mother and her teachers.92 Additionally, the principal was made
aware of the incidents, but despite the reports, no disciplinary
action was taken against G.F., nor was an effort made to separate
the two students.93 LaShonda was the subject of sexually
harassing behavior for six months until it finally ended when G.F.
pleaded guilty to sexual battery for his conduct.94 As a result of
G.F.’s harassment, LaShonda’s previously high grades dropped,
she became unable to concentrate on her studies, and she authored
a suicide note, which her father discovered. 95 When LaShonda’s
mother brought a complaint in district court under Title IX against
the school district, the district court dismissed it under Federal

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id.
526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id. at 633–34.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 634.
Id.
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Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.96 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question as to
whether a private cause of action under Title IX may be brought
against the school district for student-on-student sexual
harassment.97
Following its reasoning in Gebser, the Court held that,
because Title IX was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, a
school district can be liable for private damages when it had
adequate notice of its potential liability.98 Thus, the Court held
that a school district is liable under Title IX “only for its own
misconduct.”99 Summarizing its holding in Gebser, the Court
noted:
Accordingly, we rejected the use of agency principles to impute
liability to the district for the misconduct of its teachers.
Likewise, we declined the invitation to impose liability under
what amounted to a negligence standard—holding the district
liable for its failure to react to teacher-student harassment of
which it knew or should have known. Rather, we concluded that
the district could be liable for damages only where the district
itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX by
remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-student
harassment of which it had actual knowledge.100

Thus, following Gebser, the Court held that before a school
district can be liable for student-on-student harassment under
Title IX, the plaintiff must prove that the school official acted with
“deliberate indifference” to known acts of sexual harassment and,
as the Court explained, under this standard, a school district could
avoid liability if it responded “to known peer harassment in a
manner that is not clearly unreasonable.” 101
In addition to the actual notice and deliberate indifference
standards adopted from Gebser, the Davis Court added another
requirement for recovery for student-on-student harassment: the
plaintiff must show the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victim[ ] of

96

Id. at 636.
Id. at 639 (“We must determine whether a district’s failure to respond to
student-on-student harassment in its schools can support a private suit for money
damages.”).
98
Id. at 639–40.
99
Id. at 640.
100
Id. at 642 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283, 290
(1998)).
101
Id. at 648–49.
97

808

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:793

access to educational opportunities or benefits provided by the
school.”102 While the “severe” and “pervasive” language comes
from Title VII hostile work environment case law, the Supreme
Court adopted a higher standard and “more rigorous test” 103 for
Title IX claims for peer-to-peer harassment than employees in
Title VII cases. The Court held that, for Title IX claims of peer-topeer harassment, a student must prove that the harassment was
“so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive,” whereas, under
Title VII, an employee need only show the conduct was “severe or
pervasive.”104 “That is, Title IX focuses on a conjunctive analysis
[which creates a higher threshold for actionable conduct] while
Title VII focuses on a disjunctive analysis [which creates a lower
threshold for actionable conduct].”105
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Davis for requiring the
“severe and pervasive” test was based on the fact that, in the
context of peer-to-peer harassment, “children may regularly
interact in a manner that would be unacceptable among adults.”106
Indeed, the Supreme Court—though certainly aware of the Title
VII test for employee harassment—did not use it and, instead,
adopted a more rigorous test because “students are still learning
how to interact appropriately with their peers.”107 The Supreme
Court has noted that “[a] child’s age is far ‘more than a
chronological fact’ ”; rather, “[i]t is a fact that ‘generates
commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.’ ”108
Children “generally are less mature and responsible,” “often lack
the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them,” and “are more

102

Id. at 650.
Riccio v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226–27 (D. Conn. 2006)
(“In Davis, the Supreme Court cautioned that peer-on-peer sexual harassment is
subjected to a more rigorous test than employee harassment claims under Title VII.”).
104
Davis, 526 at 651 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 268
(7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (“There is no minimum number of incidents required
to establish a hostile work environment. That is because ‘harassment need not be both
severe and pervasive to impose liability; one or the other will do.’ ”); Morris v. City of
Colo. Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 664 (10th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(holding Title VII hostile work environment claim exists when harassment is shown
to be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment”).
105
BPS v. Bd. of Trs. for Colo. Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, No. 12-CV-02664-RMKLM, 2015 WL 5444311, at *10 n.16 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2015).
106
Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.
107
Id. at 651; see also Riccio, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
108
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (citations omitted).
103
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vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures.”109 Davis made
clear that “[d]amages are not available for simple acts of teasing
and name-calling among school children . . . even where these
comments target differences in gender.”110
In summary, the Supreme Court in Davis held that a plaintiff
bringing a Title IX lawsuit based on peer harassment must meet
a more demanding standard than that in Gebser and prove: (1) the
plaintiff was harassed “on the basis of [sex]”; (2) the harassment
was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be
said to deprive the victims of access to educational opportunities
or benefits provided by the school”; and (3) the school had “actual
knowledge” of the harassment but stayed “deliberately indifferent”
to it.111
II. PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS RAMPANT IN SCHOOLS AND
LOWER COURTS ARE TRIGGER-HAPPY TO DISMISS IT BEFORE IT
EVER REACHES A JURY
In the context of Title VII, courts and commentators alike
have been critical of the overuse of summary judgment and
dismissal.112 For example, in Gallagher v. Delaney, Judge
Weinstein of the Second Circuit fervently cautioned against the
“dangers of robust use of summary judgment to clear trial dockets”
109

Id. (citations omitted) (cleaned up).
Davis, 526 U.S. at 652.
111
Id. at 650; see generally Christine Tamer, Bullied LBGQ Students Are Afraid
but Their Schools Aren’t (and That’s the Problem): Why It’s Time to Move on from
Broken Title IX to State Tort Law as a Solution, 25 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 153, 164–70
(2020).
112
Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment
Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 98 (1999) (discussing how “many courts have been
too quick to grant summary judgment” in cases of sexual harassment in the
employment context); B. Glenn George, If You’re Not Part of the Solution, You’re Part
of the Problem: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
133, 159 (2001) (discussing how “some courts seem to be going out of their way to
protect the employer” in granting summary judgment in Title VII cases); Joanna L.
Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U.
PITT. L. REV. 671, 710 n.180 (2000) (noting that “[t]here is an emerging literature
questioning the appropriateness of summary judgment in this context [of workplace
sexual harassment] for a host of reasons”); Ann C. McGinley, #MeToo Backlash or
Simply Common Sense?: It’s Complicated, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1397, 1420 (2020)
(noting that “federal courts have aggressively granted summary judgment to
defendants in sexual harassment cases, often deciding issues of fact that would be
more appropriate for a jury to decide”); see generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L.
REV. 705, 737–54 (2007) (examining meritorious sex discrimination cases that were
never litigated because a summary judgment ruling disposed of the case).
110
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in sexual discrimination cases, noting that “[w]hatever the early
life of a federal judge, she or he usually lives in a narrow segment
of the enormously broad American socio-economic spectrum,
generally lacking the current real-life experience required in
interpreting subtle sexual dynamics of the workplace based on
nuances, subtle perceptions, and implicit communications.”113
Courts have been mindful that “many employment cases present
issues of intent, and motive, and hostile working environment,
issues not determinable on paper,” cautioning that such cases are
“rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment,
however liberalized it be.”114 That is not to say that courts do not
still dismiss meritorious Title VII harassment claims or that there
is not progress to be made,115 but the #MeToo impact has at least
made progress in the context of Title VII.
The same cannot be said of Title IX. Even in the #MeToo
world, courts are almost trigger-happy to dismiss student victims
of peer sexual harassment and assault at the motion to dismiss
and motion for summary judgment stage. An analysis of 174 cases
from 2017 to 2020 that involved peer harassment claims under
Title IX revealed that 102 cases out of 174 (58.6%) were dismissed
at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage.116
In Davis, the Supreme Court expressly gave lower courts
permission to protect schools from liability by dismissing cases—
either for failure to state a claim or on summary judgment—under
the deliberate indifference standard, explaining “[i]n an
appropriate case, there is no reason why courts, on a motion to
dismiss, for summary judgment, or for a directed verdict, could not
identify a response as not ‘clearly unreasonable’ as a matter of
law.”117 The deliberate indifference standard is by far the “main
issue used to eliminate cases on preliminary motions under Title
IX, as well as the principal one used by litigators to decide whether
cases for survivors will be brought at all.”118 Of the 102 cases
113

Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342–43 (2d Cir. 1998).
Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 243, 286, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d
296, 331–32 (Ct. App. 2009).
115
Kate Webber Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The Lessons of
Fox News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN STATE L. REV. 463, 495
(2018) (“[C]ourt interpretations of Title VII favor employers and undermine the ability
of Title VII to deter harassment.”).
116
See supra note 7.
117
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649
(1999).
118
Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for
Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038, 2040–41, 2040 n.5 (2016); see
114
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where dismissal or summary judgment was granted or upheld, 82
cases (80.3%) did so in whole or in part on the deliberate
indifference element.119 But, as discussed infra, courts are not only
granting dismissal and summary judgment on the deliberate
indifference element. Of the 102 cases where a motion to dismiss
or a motion for summary judgment was granted, 20 granted
dismissal without ever reaching the deliberate indifference
element.120 Many of these courts did so because they harassment
alleged by the student-plaintiff was, in the courts’ eyes, not sexbased enough or not severe and pervasive enough to require a
response from the school. 121

also Margaret Nolan, It Is Not Working: Examining an Employment Law Model for
Determining Institutional Liability in Cases of Sexual Assault by Student-Athletes, 27
JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 329, 335 (2020) (“A significant portion of cases
brought against schools for sexual assault under Title IX have been dismissed on
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss for failure to satisfy the prongs of actual
notice and deliberate indifference.”).
119
See supra note 7.
120
See id.
121
See id.; see also e.g., Feucht v. Triad Loc. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 425 F. Supp. 3d
914, 918, 931 (S.D. Ohio 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-4270, 2020 WL 3498112 (6th
Cir. May 20, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss in case where a female middle school
victim died by suicide because harassment, which included “name-calling, verbal and
physical harassment, sexual harassment, and physical pushing, shoving and elbowing
in the school halls, during class, at recess, and on the bus” and a threat by peers that
they “would tie the girls up and rape them” did not “rise to the level of sexual
harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it could be said
to deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided
by the school.”); C.M. v. Pemberton Twp. High Sch., No. CV 16-9456 (RMB/JS), 2017
WL 384274, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2017) (dismissing student’s Title IX claim against
school because student has “not alleged harassment that is ‘so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive’ such that it has deprived [the student] access to the educational
opportunities or benefits provided by her school.”); Schaefer v. Yongjie Fu, 272 F.
Supp. 3d 285, 288 (D. Mass. 2017) (granting motion to dismiss because peer
harassment was not “severe and pervasive sexual harassment, as required for a Title
IX claim.”) (citation omitted); Chavez v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-CV2563-B, 2017 WL 3620388, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2017) (granting motion to
dismiss because the harassment the student suffered was not sex-based or pervasive);
Humphries v. Penn. State Univ., 492 F.Supp.3d 393, 403 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2020)
(granting motion to dismiss because student “does not allege that he was harassed
because of [his] sex”); Doe v. Bd. of Visitors of Va. Mil. Inst., 494 F. Supp. 3d 363, 379
(W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss for failure to show harassment
was on the basis of sex); D.S. ex rel. C.S. v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., No. 6:19-CV6528 EAW, 2020 WL 7028523, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (granting motion to
dismiss because plaintiff failed to prove actionable harassment on the basis of sex);
Doe T.L.J. v. Univ. of Cent. Mo., No. 4:20-00714-CV-RK, 2020 WL 7700101, at *3
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss because plaintiff only alleged
single incident of sexual assault which did not meet severe and pervasive standard).
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Additionally, courts are oftentimes choosing to “beat a dead
horse,” meaning that courts are dismissing on the deliberate
indifference element plus additional element or elements, even
though granting dismissal on deliberate indifference alone would
have been sufficient. Of the 82 cases where dismissal was granted
at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage, 58 cases
were dismissal on only the deliberate indifference element and 24
granted dismissal on deliberate indifference plus another
element.122
A review of lower court opinions in the context of Title IX
demonstrate that lower courts are necessarily departing from the
motion to dismiss and summary judgment standards to reach their
conclusions in many cases where the facts could plainly be
characterized as actionable sexual harassment and deliberate
indifference on the part of the schools. In his recent dissenting
opinion, Justice Moore of the Sixth Circuit aptly made this point,
explaining that “[c]ourts ordinarily begin their analysis with a
recitation of the standards that govern their review of the issues
presented,” a “practice [that] may not lead to the flashiest
opinions—the practice may even seem a bit dull—but it serves at
least a few important functions,” including “remind[ing] the writer
[that is, the court] of [its] role” which is not that of making
“[c]redibility judgments and weighing . . . the evidence.”123
What is the court’s role in deciding a motion to dismiss? At
the 12(b)(6) stage, courts are supposed to accept “all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff . . . and ask whether the pleadings contain ‘enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”124 A motion
to dismiss should not be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.”125 While a motion to dismiss
under 12(b)(6) “is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted,”126 in
just the last three years, of the 91 motions to dismiss brought in
Title IX causes of action for peer-to-peer harassment, 38 (or 41.8%)

122

See supra note 7.
Foster v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., 982 F.3d 960, 980 (6th Cir. 2020)
(Moore, J., dissenting); Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
124
Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2016)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
125
Colle v. Brazos Cnty., Tex., 981 F.2d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
126
Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
123
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of all motions to dismiss brought were granted.127 Is it that
attorneys are filing frivolous cases? Generally, no. Instead, many
judges are not applying the correct standard, one that allows “a
well-pleaded complaint [to] proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge
that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is improbable, and ‘that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely.’ ”128
The same question can be asked at summary judgment, which
is appropriate only where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.”129 While summary judgment is
appropriate only where the evidence “is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law,”130 over the last three years of the
83 motions for summary judgment filed in cases involving Title IX
peer-to-peer harassment, 64 motions for summary judgment
brought were granted (or 77.1%).131 Is it that “reasonable minds
could [not] differ as to the import of the evidence”132 in all these
cases? Again, generally, no. Rather, many courts are not applying
the correct standard, one that “draw[s] all reasonable inferences
in favor of the non-moving party and construe[s] all evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”133
For example, how can a court—taking “all well-pleaded facts
as true [and] viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff”134—hold that a male middle school student threatening
to tie a female classmate up in his basement, staring at her in class
and making animal noises, and calling her a “bitch” is insufficient
to even state a claim for harassment on the basis of sex?135 How
can a court—taking “all well-pleaded facts as true [and] viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s],”136 including a
middle school female who died by suicide, hold that a middle school
male’s “name-calling, verbal and physical harassment, sexual
harassment, and physical pushing, shoving and elbowing in the
127

See supra note 7.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citation omitted).
129
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
130
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
131
See supra note 7.
132
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
133
Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2012).
134
Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2016)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
135
Diebold v. Hartford Pub. Sch., No. 1:15-CV-529, 2017 WL 4512575, at *1–*2,
*6 (W.D. Mich. May 25, 2017).
136
Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C., 819 F.3d at 174 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
128
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school halls, during class, at recess, and on the bus” and a threat
to “tie the girls up and rape them” is insufficient to state a claim
for “severe [and] pervasive” harassment?137 The Southern District
of Ohio court gave the following reasoning:
While this Court certainly does not want to downplay the vile
threat that male students allegedly made toward Bethany and
her friend that they “would tie the girls up and rape them,” or
any alleged sexual harassment that she endured, the factual
content alleged in the Complaint, while unacceptable, “does not
rise to the level of sexual harassment that is so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it could be said to deprive the
plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or benefits
provided by the school.”138

Translated: the court did not want to “downplay” what it admitted
was “vile” sexual conduct but held that such conduct was not
sufficient to even to state a claim that could meet the low bar of
being “plausible on its face.”139
Holdings like these would be disturbing at any point in time,
however, the fact that these holdings were made in the #MeToo
era and that holdings like these are still being made is shocking.
With what we know about the prevalence of sexual harassment
and how victims respond,140 it is past time to address the fact that
courts are not correctly applying the motion to dismiss or motion
for summary judgment standards in the context of Title IX peerharassment and instead are regularly holding children victims to
impossible standards. If, at the motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment stage, the harassment is held to be not sexual
enough, the harassment is held not to be severe and pervasive
enough, or the suffering is held not to be concrete enough, under
Title IX, a school district does not even have to respond to it—that
is, it does not even trigger a burden on the school district to act in
a way that is not “clearly unreasonable.”141 This has the dire effect
137
Feucht v. Triad Loc. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 425 F. Supp. 3d 914, 918, 931 (S.D. Ohio
2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-4270, 2020 WL 3498112 (6th Cir. May 20, 2020).
138
Id. at 931 (emphasis added).
139
Id. at 922, 931; see generally Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir.
2011).
140
Arzate, supra note 47; Andrea Giampetro-Meyer et al., Sexual Harassment in
Schools: An Analysis of the “Knew or Should Have Known” Liability Standard in Title
IX Peer Sexual Harassment Cases, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 301, 304–05 (1997) (listing
the physical, psychological, and social problems that may develop as the result of being
the victim of sexual harassment).
141
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648–50
(1999).
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of both limiting the scope of actionable sexual harassment—and,
therefore, schools’ responsibility to protect the children in their
care—and sending schools the message that they do not need to
better protect students, even in the face of egregious harassment.
By holding that plaintiffs’ evidence—taken as true and with all
inferences drawn in their favor—does not rise to the level of so
much as stating a claim or creating an issue of fact, courts—in the
most literal sense of the word—dismiss victims of sexual
harassment.142
III. BEYOND DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE AND BEATING A DEAD
HORSE: LOWER COURTS’ RAISING THE BAR BEYOND DAVIS AND
OVERUSE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL TO NARROW
THE SCOPE OF ACTIONABLE HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX
While it is troubling that lower courts are too easily
dismissing cases under the deliberate indifference standard and
thereby “permit[ting] a wide margin of tolerance for sexual
abuse,”143 discussed further in Part IV, it is even more troubling
that lower courts are dismissing cases before they even reach the
deliberate indifference standard or in addition to the deliberate
indifference standard.
Courts are granting dismissal and
summary judgment because the harassment alleged was not
sexual enough, or because the sexual harassment suffered was not
severe and pervasive enough, or because the injury the plaintiff
suffered was not concrete enough. That is, as high as the Davis
standard is, lower courts have interpreted every element to make
it unduly higher, which has the effect of normalizing sexual
harassment in schools and making sexual harassment that would
be deemed unacceptable in the workplace, perfectly acceptable in
schools.
This Part identifies three areas where the courts have
interpreted Davis to make the playground less safe than the
watercooler, comparing how courts apply the “on the basis of sex”
element, the harassers’ conduct element, and the injury element
under both Title VII and Title IX. This Part shows how lower
courts are applying Davis too strictly—especially at the motion to
142
Walker, supra note 27, at 112–13 (noting that “[o]ne of the most disturbing
trends in post-Davis litigation is the subtle questioning of a survivor’s allegations in
resolving motions for dismissal or summary judgment despite the fact that ‘[t]he
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in [her] favor.’ ”).
143
MacKinnon, supra note 118, at 2040–41.
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dismiss and summary judgment stage—and, as a result, children
are left unprotected from peer sexual harassment in schools.
Finally, this Part addresses how courts—within the Davis
framework—can and should approach motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment in Title IX peer sexual harassment
cases.
While it would be ideal to have the Supreme Court lessen the
Davis standard, it seems unlikely to happen. However, as set forth
below, courts can better protect students within the current
confines of the law through a proper application of the motion to
dismiss and summary judgment standards and a proper
interpretation of Davis.
A.

The “Looking at the Sexual Motivation of a Child” Problem

In order to establish a Title IX cause of action, a studentplaintiff must prove that she suffered harassment because of his
sex.144 Harassment “on the basis of sex is the sine qua non of a
Title IX sexual harassment case, and a failure to plead that
element is fatal.” 145 For harassment to be “on the basis of sex,”
“the conduct at issue [must have] a sexual or gender-based
component”146 and “must be based on sex, rather than personal
animus or other reasons.”147 In determining whether harassment
is “on the basis of sex,” courts look to Title VII legal analysis148 and
144

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2002).
146
McSweeney v. Bayport Bluepoint Cent. Sch. Dist., 864 F. Supp. 2d 240, 257
(E.D.N.Y. 2012).
147
Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 303, 213 F. Supp. 2d 917, 930 (C.D. Ill.
2002); Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:08-CV-1559-BF,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11073, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2010) aff’d, 647 F.3d 156 (5th
Cir. 2011).
148
See, e.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
647 (1999) (relying on Title VII jurisprudence for Title IX sexual harassment case);
Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (same); Fuhr v. Hazel
Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he standards articulated by
Title VII cases are sufficient to establish the applicable legal framework here.”); Wolfe
v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 866 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We recognize
Oncale is a Title VII case and is premised on different language than a Title IX case.
Specifically, Title VII requires a plaintiff to prove ‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . .
sex,’ [ ], whereas Title IX requires proof of discrimination ‘on the basis of sex.’ But,
these two phrases are treated interchangeably.”); Papelino v. Albany Coll. of
Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[A] Title IX sex
discrimination claim requires the same kind of proof required in a Title VII sex
discrimination claim”); Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 813
F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Because Title VII prohibits the identical conduct
prohibited by Title IX, i.e., sex discrimination, we regard it as the most appropriate
145

2021] WATERCOOLER IS SAFER THAN THE SCHOOLYARD

817

specifically, Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,149 where
the Supreme Court provided multiple “evidentiary route[s]” for a
plaintiff to prove that “the conduct at issue was not merely tinged
with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted
‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.’ ”150
In Oncale, a Title VII case, the Supreme Court was clear that
“harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to
support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.”151
Rather, the Supreme Court laid out multiple “evidentiary route[s]”
to prove an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. 152 To
the contrast, in the context of Title IX and peer-to-peer
harassment, courts are holding that in order to satisfy the “on the
basis of sex” element of their claim, plaintiffs must prove the
subjective sexual motivation of the student harasser, who is often
a young child, and questioning whether theese young child
harassers—as a matter of law—have enough “sexual awareness”
to ever meet this element.153 Not only is the requirement of a
showing of sexual awareness or motivation on the part of the
student harasser legally unsound and not required by Title IX, it
is wrongly excusing the relevant actor—the school district—from
addressing sexual harassment in its halls based on the subjective
sexual awareness,or unawareness, of a child and thereby, as a
matter of law, causing children to “tolerate” sexual conduct in
schools, which would be deemed unacceptable in an adult
workplace.
analogue when defining Title IX’s substantive standards.”); Videckis v. Pepperdine
Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (applying Title VII principles in
interpreting Title IX, and holding that the distinction between sexual orientation
discrimination and gender stereotyping discrimination “is illusory and artificial”).
149
523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998).
150
Id. at 81.
151
Id. at 80.
152
First, the Court held the inference is “easy to draw” when the conduct “involves
explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity” between opposite sexes because “it is
reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the
same sex.” Id. Second, the Court held the inference can be met when, for example, a
woman harasses another woman “in such sex-specific and derogatory terms . . . as to
make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of
women in the workplace.” Id. Third, the court held sex-based discrimination could be
shown through “com-parative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated
members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.” Id. at 81.
153
Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, IL. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 826,
827 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rovner, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment );
Id. at 821 (questioning “whether a five or six year old kindergartner can ever engage
in conduct constituting ‘sexual harassment’ or ‘gender discrimination’ under Title
IX.”).
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The Playground: Lower Courts are Excusing Schools from
Liability by Requiring a Showing of a Student’s Sexual
Motivation to Satisfy Title IX’s “on the Basis of Sex” Element

A female kindergartener, age five, stated that a peer, age six,
was “bothering” her and did “nasty stuff” to her at the start of
school in August and, by September, the victim “became reluctant
to go to school,” was “crying at the door when it was time to go,”
and “began wetting her bed and having nightmares around this
time.”154 By October, the teachers saw the boy “jump[ed] on” the
plaintiff, “lean[ed] against [her] with his hands on his crotch,”
“unzip[ed] his pants” on more than one occasion in front of the
class, put his “hands down [another girl’s] pants during storytime,”
and kissed classmates at recess.155 The plaintiff’s father testified
that his daughter told him that the boy “fondled” her and touched
her “private parts [and] chest.”156 Is this harassment sex-based?
In the context of both Title VII and Title IX, courts have
uniformly held that sexual harassment includes both sexual
advances as well as attacks on the victim’s masculinity or
femininity, that is, the victim’s failure to conform to masculine or
feminine stereotypes.157 Therefore, the answer to the above
question, one would think, should be “yes” or, at the very least, the
conduct—looked at in the light most favorable to the victim—
raises, at a minimum, a genuine issue of material fact with respect
to whether the harassment is sex-based. However, the Seventh
Circuit in Gabrielle—while not reaching a holding on the issue—
said that the facts raised “a threshold question, altogether
reasonable and rational, of whether a five or six year old

154

Id. at 818–19.
Id.
156
Id. at 821.
157
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that “the systematic abuse directed at [the plaintiff] reflected a belief that [he] did not
act as a man should act” constituted actionable harassment under Title
VII); Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–92 (D.
Minn. 2000) (applying Title VII precedents to Title IX claim, the court concluded that
allegations of harassment because of the plaintiff’s failure to meet masculine
stereotypes states a cognizable claim of sex discrimination); Schroeder ex rel.
Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869, 879–80 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(holding that gay slurs and physical violence could be based on sex even when there
was no sexual assault); Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp.
2d 952, 972 (D. Kan. 2005) (“[A] rational trier of fact could infer that plaintiff was
harassed because he failed to satisfy his peers’ stereotyped expectations for his gender
because the primary objective of plaintiff’s harassers appears to have been to
disparage his perceived lack of masculinity.”).
155
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kindergartner can ever engage in conduct constituting ‘sexual
harassment’ or ‘gender discrimination’ under Title IX.”158 The
court noted that “[c]ommon sense, at least, would reject any such
extension of Title IX.”159
In Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Arkansas School District, between
sixth- and tenth-grade, a male student was relentlessly bullied by
his peers.160 They pushed him, shoved him, called him “faggot,”
“queer bait,” and “homo.”161 They slammed his head into a
window, created a Facebook page called “Every One [sic] That
Hates Billy Wolfe,” and photoshopped his face “onto a figure in a
green fairy costume with the word ‘HOMOSEXUAL’ written
across it.”162
They graffitied “highly offensive, homosexual
accusations about [him] on bathroom walls and in classroom text
books.”163 The victim argued that the bullying he suffered was an
attempt to degrade his masculinity.164 However, the peers argued
that they bullied the victim simply because they did not like him
and thought he was a bad person.165 Is this harassment sex-based?
The Eighth Circuit answered in the negative, explaining that it
was insufficient under Title IX “to show the harassers used namecalling and spread rumors in an effort to debase his
masculinity.”166 Instead, the court held that to prove the
harassment was “on the basis of sex,” the plaintiff must establish
“underlying intent, and therefore, motivation, on the part of the
actor to discriminate because of one’s sex or gender.”167
Similarly, in I.V. v. Wenatchee School District No. 246, the
middle school victim was relentlessly bullied by a male peer, who
would “twist [his] nipples” and call him names including “fat”,
“faggot”, “man boobs,” “gay,” and “bitch.”168 However, the court
held that, “[a]lthough some of the complained of conduct is
arguably ‘tinged’ with sexual connotation,” the plaintiff failed to
prove the harassment was “because of sex” because there was no
evidence of the bully’s motivation. 169 Indeed, the court noted that
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Gabrielle, 315 F.3d at 821.
Id. at 821–22.
648 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 862–63.
Id. at 865.
Id.
342 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1087–88 (E.D. Wash. 2018).
Id. at 1096.
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the plaintiff “did not even depose” the bully as to his motivation.170
The court in granting summary judgment to the school district,
relied on expert testimony that the “terms, ‘fag,’ ‘faggot,’ ‘bitch’ and
‘gay’ are ubiquitous,” and “used with high frequency by boys too
young to initially know that the terms have any sexual
connotation.”171
Thus, courts have held that—regardless of the child’s age—we
need to look at the subjective intent and motivation of the
harasser, who is often a minor, to determine whether harassment
is on the basis of sex.
2.

The Watercooler: Courts Do Not Excuse an Employer from
Liability Because of a Failure to Prove an Adult Harasser’s
Motive

The holdings reached in the context of Title IX are wholly at
odds with Title VII, even though courts are uniform in holding that
Title VII’s “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” requirement
should be “treated interchangeably” with Title IX’s “on the basis
of sex” requirement.172 In the context of Title VII, courts hold that
the “Supreme Court precedent does not support the need for a
plaintiff to demonstrate direct evidence of her harasser’s
motivation for discrimination against her.”173 This is because
“[p]articularly in the discrimination area, it is often difficult to
determine the motivations of an action and any analysis is filled
with pitfalls and ambiguities . . . . [A] discrimination analysis
must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall
scenario.”174 For example, in Evans, a female employee was
subjected to remarks such as that she “made too much money for
a goddamn woman” and, as a male employee “grabbed [her]
buttocks from behind while she was bending over her files,” he said
that “she smelled good.”175 The Third Circuit held: “We generally
presume that sexual advances of the kind alleged in this case are
sex-based, whether the motivation is desire or hatred,” dismissing
the defendant’s argument that “the overtly sexual acts did not

170

Id. at 1095.
Id.
172
Wolfe, 648 F.3d at 866 (citations omitted).
173
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 278 (3d Cir. 2001).
174
Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir.1999) (citations
omitted).
175
Id. at 145–46.
171
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occur and that the non-sexual actions taken against [the victim]
have innocent explanations.”176
Thus, unlike the Title IX cases supra, in the context of Title
VII, courts do not hold that a failure to prove the harasser’s
motivation is dispositive, nor do courts “take the bully’s word for
it” that the harassment was not sex-based. For example, in
contrast to its holding in Wolfe, in the context of Title VII, the
Eighth Circuit has held that “[s]exual harassment can take place
in many different ways”; that “obscene name-calling” can amount
to harassment based on sex; and that a harasser’s explanation that
the conduct was because he “did not get along” with the victim is
not dispositive of whether harassment is sex-based.177 Whereas in
Wolfe, the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to prove the
harassment was on the basis of sex in light of the bullies’
testimony that their motivation was personal animus as opposed
to sex, in the workplace the Eighth Circuit has held that “[t]here
is no excuse in any work environment for subjecting a female
worker to such verbal abuse even if the harasser and the plaintiff
did not like each other, especially when this dislike results in a
steady stream of sexual harassment.”178
3.

Davis Does Not Instruct Lower Courts to Focus on the
Sexual Motivation of the Student Harasser and Lower
Courts Must Stop Dismissing Harassment Away Under This
Element

In Wolfe, the Eighth Circuit stated that “[o]ur reading of Title
IX as requiring proof of the underlying motivation for the
discrimination is consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Oncale and Davis.”179 However, neither case actually supports
requiring proof of sexual motivation. First, “Oncale made
abundantly clear that, for a plaintiff to prove that she was sexually
176

Id. at 148–49.
Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 964–65 (8th Cir. 1993) (“We
cannot accept the employer’s callous explanation that since Ottaway and Burns did
not get along together, his ‘verbal assault on Plaintiff would have occurred even if
Plaintiff had not been a woman.’ There is no excuse in any work environment for
subjecting a female worker to such verbal abuse even if the harasser and the plaintiff
did not like each other, especially when this dislike results in a steady stream of sexual
harassment. Vulgar and offensive epithets such as these are ‘widely recognized as not
only improper but as intensely degrading, deriving their power to wound not only from
their meaning but also from ‘the disgust and violence they express phonetically.’ ”).
178
Compare Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 865 (8th Cir.
2011), with Burns, 989 F.2d at 965.
179
Wolfe, 648 F.3d 860, 865–66 (8th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
177
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harassed, she need not show that the harasser was ‘motivated by
sexual desire.’ ”180 Second, Davis did not hold that the standard of
whether conduct is gender- or sex-based differed in the school
setting versus employment setting. Rather, lower courts have
been misapplying Davis and the motion to dismiss and summary
judgment standards to dispose of plaintiffs’ cases on the “on the
basis of sex” element.
a.

The Supreme Court Was Clear That the Relevant Actor Is the
School District Under Title IX Such That the Sexual
Motivation of the Harasser Is Irrelevant

In the Title VII hostile work environment context, the
relevant actor is the employer—not the individual harasser—as it
is the employer that is made liable under Title VII. 181 Accordingly,
“any inquiry into the discriminatory motive or intent behind the
actual harassment is necessarily one step removed from the
defendant in the case.”182 The Ninth Circuit explained that in the
context of Title VII a plaintiff need not prove that the employee
“had a specific intent to discriminate against women or to target
them ‘as women,’ . . . whether sexually or otherwise” because
“Title VII is not a fault-based tort scheme.”183 Rather, “Title VII is
aimed at the consequences or effects of an employment practice
and not at the . . . motivation of co-workers or employers” such
that “conduct may be ‘unlawful sexual harassment even when
harassers do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile
working environment.’ ”184 This is because “it is the employer that
is held liable for workplace harassment,” and thus “it is the
180
Love v. Motiva Enterprises LLC, 349 Fed. App’x 900, 907–08 (5th Cir. 2009)
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
80 (1998)).
181
Julie A. Seaman, Form and (Dys)function in Sexual Harassment Law: Biology,
Culture, and the Spandrels of Title VII, 37 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 321, 425 (2005).
182
Id. at 426.
183
E.E.O.C. v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2005)
(citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir.1991)).
184
Id. at 844–45 (citations omitted) (cleaned up); see also Petrosino v. Bell
Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 221–223 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing why the “objective hostility
of a work environment” does not depend on the perpetrator’s motivations, but rather,
“depends on the totality of the circumstances” as viewed by a “reasonable person in
the plaintiff’s position”); Yuknis v. First Student, Inc., 481 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.
2007) (citations omitted) (holding that the motivations of the actors are not
determinative: “[W]e do not mean to suggest that there must be an intention of
causing distress or offense. A working environment may be deeply hurtful to women
even though the men who created it were merely trying to please themselves, and
were thus guilty of insensitivity rather than aggression.”).
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employer’s response to the harassment, and not the perpetrator’s
intent, that matters.”185
Similar to Title VII, where the relevant actor is the employer,
the Davis Court was clear that, in Title IX, the relevant actor is
the school district. The Supreme Court emphasized that a school
district is liable under Title IX “only for its own misconduct.”186
Therefore, similar to Title VII, because the defendant in a Title IX
cause of action is the school district, not the peer harasser, “any
inquiry into the discriminatory motive or intent behind the actual
harassment is [likewise] necessarily one step removed from the
defendant in the case.”187 And it is more true in the context of Title
IX, because children do not have the same level of understanding
as adults—something the Davis Court was also clear about.188
Indeed, “whatever the children’s comprehension may have been,
the adults charged with their care and education had the ability
to appreciate the inappropriate and potentially harmful nature of
the conduct.”189 Thus, the validity of a Title IX claim for sexual
harassment should not depend “upon the sexual awareness of the
harasser or harassee.”190 Rather, the court should look at the
record and see if it “supports the inference that [the] acts were
based on sex.”191 This is precisely what courts do in the context of
Title VII—the intent or motivation of the harasser is not
determinative.192 As explained by the Ninth Circuit: “[S]o long as
the environment itself is hostile to the plaintiff because of [her or
his] sex, why the harassment was perpetrated (sexual interest?
misogyny? personal vendetta? misguided humor? boredom?) is
beside the point.”193
In the Gabrielle case, Judge Rovner in his concurring opinion
noted that, even though the six-year-old bully “likely did not
185
Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 827
(7th Cir. 2003).
186
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640
(1999).
187
Seaman, supra note 181, at 426; see Gabrielle, 315 F.3d at 827 (Rovner, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The knowledge and intent of the
school district are therefore central to the liability determination; the knowledge and
intent of the student perpetrating the harassment are really irrelevant.”).
188
See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (1999).
189
Gabrielle, 315 F.3d at 827 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
190
Id. at 826.
191
Id. at 827.
192
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
193
Id. (quoting Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 578 (1997),
vacated, City of Belleville v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998)).
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realize that he was harming his female classmate[,] . . . his
ignorance says nothing about the extent to which his actions
interfered with [the victim’s] educational opportunities or about
the school district’s awareness of and response to his conduct,”
and, “[c]onversely, [the bully’s] knowledge and intent, even if
culpable, would not suffice to render the school district liable—
only the district’s own deliberate indifference to the harassment
could do that.”194 Thus, the concurring justice opined that the
focus of Title IX’s “on the basis of sex” requirement should not rest
on what the bully “was capable of realizing at age six” because “[i]t
is the school district, not [the student harasser], that is charged
with liability,” such that “[t]he question we must decide is whether
the school, when confronted with acts that amounted to sex-based
harassment,
evinced
deliberate
indifference
to
that
harassment.”195
Therefore, in Gabrielle, the unwelcome touching of genitals,
even if the harasser was unaware of the sexual significance,
should be inferred to be “on the basis of sex.”196 Similarly, in Wolfe,
calling someone “faggot,” “queer bait,” and “homo,” photoshopping
his face on a green fairy, and graffitiing “highly offensive,
homosexual accusations,” should be sufficient to create a fact issue
that such conduct is gender-based.197 The court was incorrect to
require evidence of the harassers’ subjective motivation because it
is the school district’s knowledge of and action in response to the
harassers’ conduct that is relevant to liability under Title IX, not
the subjective intent or motivation of the harassers. Likewise in
I.V., a failure to depose the harassers of their motivation or the
fact that the harassers were “too young” to know that words like
“fag,” “faggot,” “bitch” and “gay” had a gendered or sexual meaning
should not have been dispositive,198 because—similar to Title VII—
“[s]o long as the environment itself is hostile to the plaintiff
because of [her or his] sex,” it “is beside the point” “why the
harassment was perpetrated.”199

194
Gabrielle, 315 F.3d at 827–28 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
195
Id. at 826, 827, 828.
196
Id. at 826–27.
197
Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2011).
198
I. V. v. Wenatchee Sch. Dist. No. 246, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1095–96 (E.D.
Wash. 2018).
199
See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc).
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Davis Did Not Hold That the Age of the Child Affects Whether
Conduct Is Sex-Based

In Burwell v. Pekin Community High School District 303, the
plaintiff argued that the harassment was on the basis of sex
because “she was called sexual names, such as bitch, pussy, and
slut.”200 The court, in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, held:
“[T]here is little in the record other than Plaintiff’s speculative
inferences regarding the male students’ motivation to support this
argument.”201 The court held that it was improper to rely on Title
VII case law that “argues that the use of gender-based terms ‘can
be interpreted by a trier of fact as motivation and intent to
discriminate on the basis of sex’ ” because “Davis specifically
stated that courts must bear in mind that schools are unlike adult
workplaces and that children may regularly interact in ways that
would be unacceptable among adults.”202 However, Davis did not
hold that the standard of whether conduct is gender- or sex-based
differed in the school setting versus employment setting. Rather,
Davis held that whether gender- or sex-based conduct rose to the
level of actionable harassment depended on a “constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations and relationships”
because “children may regularly interact in a manner that would
be unacceptable among adults.”203 Thus, to prove “actionable
harassment” in Title IX, plaintiffs must satisfy the more difficult
“severe and pervasive” test, whereas in Title VII plaintiffs must
satisfy the less difficult “severe or pervasive” test.204
Importantly, while the standard of conduct—“severe or
pervasive” in Title VII versus “severe and pervasive” in Title IX—
was intended to be different in the workplace and schoolyard, the
standard for whether the conduct was “on the basis of sex” was
not. It cannot be that being “called sexual names, such as bitch,
pussy, and slut,”205 is gender- or sex-based conduct in the
workplace, but not in the schoolyard. It might be that in the
workplace such is actionable sex-based conduct, whereas in the
schoolyard such is not given the higher “severe and pervasive”

200

213 F. Supp. 2d 917, 930 (C.D. Ill. 2002).
Id. at 930–31.
202
Id. at 931 (citing Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 651 (1999)).
203
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651
(1999) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)).
204
Compare id., with Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993).
205
Burwell, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
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Title IX standard, but, regardless of whether in the schoolyard or
workplace, use of sexual epithets, such as “bitch, pussy, and slut”
is gender- or sex-based conduct in both. Therefore, the Burwell
court was wrong to hold that, what the court itself labeled as,
“gender-based terms” and “sexual names,” were insufficient to
meet the low of threshold of stating a plausible claim of sex-based
conduct.206
It is also important to bear in mind that children are less
developed than adults and may not have the maturity to know why
they are targeting another child, or, even if they know why, they
may not be able to communicate it.207 These children “may act out
ingrained notions of sexuality and gender expectations without
any conscious intent to treat persons differently based on their
sex” such that imposing a requirement to prove motive or intent to
discriminate on the basis of sex in the context of Title IX “would
effectively immunize peer sexual harassment from the reach of
Title IX.”208 As put by one court, because “[s]ex-based harassment
includes when someone is harassed because of his sex, even if it is
not sexual in nature, . . . whether the [children] knew their
conduct was sexual is beside the point.”209
c.

Courts Must Stop Giving Every Inference in Favor of the School
Districts

While requiring a plaintiff to prove sexual motivation is
incorrect, the bigger problem ultimately is that courts are not
correctly applying the Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 standard in
granting dismissal “on the basis of sex.” First, even assuming for
sake of argument that it were correct to require sexual motivation
on the part of the student harasser, “[i]ssues of causation, intent,
and motivation are questions of fact” that should be left to the
jury.210 “Although summary judgment in discrimination cases is
‘fully appropriate, indeed mandated, when the evidence is
insufficient to support the non-moving party’s case,’ [and] ‘when,
as is often the case in sexual harassment claims,’ fact questions

206

Id. at 930–31.
Deborah Brake, The Cruelest of the Gender Police: Student-to-Student Sexual
Harassment and Anti-Gay Peer Harassment Under Title IX, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
37, 88–89 (1999).
208
Id.
209
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., No. 15 CV 5018, 2019 WL 3554207, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2019).
210
Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 178 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
207
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such as ‘state of mind or intent are at issue,’ summary judgment
‘should be used sparingly.’ ”211
As the Second Circuit held in the context of Title VII, “[t]he
interpretation of ambiguous conduct is ‘an issue for the jury.’ ”212
For example, had the court in I.V. applied the correct standard on
summary judgment—taking all inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor—it cannot be that “no reasonable juror” could have
determined that “twist[ing] nipples” and calling a peer names
including “fat”, “faggot”, “man boobs,” “gay,” and “bitch” was
harassment on the basis of sex.213 While it is possible a jury could
have concluded that the harassment occurred simply because “[the
harasser] was a bully, and, as bullies tend to do, he targeted a
weaker student”—as the court held in granting summary
judgment—a jury could also reasonably conclude that the
harassment was because of the victim’s failure to conform with
male stereotypes.214
Additionally, when a court admits that conduct is of a sexual
nature but holds that such conduct cannot plausibly be sex-based,
that court is necessarily not applying the correct standard of
review. For example, in Eilenfeldt v. United C.U.S.D. #304 Board
of Education, the court held the plaintiff, who was a seventh-grade
boy, failed to state a Title IX claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when
he alleged that students—while pushing, punching, and kicking
him—called him a “rapist,” “pedophile,” “child molester,” and said
“he was sexually attracted to young boys.”215 Students also
“produced pictures, graffiti artwork, and videos depicting [the
plaintiff] as a pedophile and child molester.”216 The court reasoned
that, although the harassment was “of a sexual nature,” the
plaintiff failed to allege he was harassed “because of his male
gender or his failure to conform to male gender norms.”217 It
should not be that a court dismisses a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
for not being on “on the basis of sex” when the court—like
Eilenfeldt—admits that the harassment was “of a sexual
nature.”218
211

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
213
I.V. v. Wenatchee Sch. Dist. No. 246, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1087–88 (E.D.
Wash. 2018).
214
See id. at 1096.
215
30 F. Supp. 3d 780, 784–85 (C.D. Ill. 2014).
216
Id.
217
Id. at 788.
218
Id.
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Compare the approach in Eilenfeldt to that in S.E.S. ex rel.
J.M.S. v. Galena Unified School District No. 499, where a middle
school male student was called names such as “gay,” “queer,”
“bitch,” “fag,” and “faggot” throughout middle school.219 The
J.M.S. court, in denying summary judgment, held the summary
judgment evidence could produce a “rational finding that the
alleged discrimination . . . resulted from reasons completely
unrelated to J.M.S.’s gender or perceived sexual orientation,”
however, the court added, “[b]ut, the opposite is equally true: a
rational trier of fact also could conclude the harassers’ comments
were based on J.M.S.’s failure to conform to the other male
students’ stereotypes for masculinity—i.e., how a stereotypical
middle school aged boy should look and act.”220 The court held that
“[o]n summary judgment, the court isn’t free to weigh the evidence
and competing inferences and declare a winner,” but, “[t]o the
contrary, [the] jury must decide whether J.M.S.’s peers engaged in
the conduct at issue here based on J.M.S.’s sex.”221 This is the
correct approach because—at the motion to dismiss and summary
judgment stages—courts should not be weighing “competing
inferences.”222
In summary, whether conduct is sexual should not depend on
where it takes place (the schoolyard versus the workplace) or the
age of actors (children versus adults). Under both Title VII and
Title IX, the analysis of whether conduct was “on the basis of sex”
should be the same.223 Davis did not depart from Onacle’s holding
that sexual motivation is not required, 224 nor did it hold that
conduct that it is objectively sexual is not sexual in the context of
Title IX because of the age of the child harasser. It is problematic
that courts are dismissing at the failure to state a claim or
summary judgment stage in Title IX causes of action on the ground
that the plaintiff failed to prove the conduct was “on the basis of
sex,” when a very reasonable inference from many of these cases’
facts is that the conduct was sex-based.

219
220
221
222
223
224

446 F. Supp. 3d 743, 762 (D. Kan. 2020).
Id. at 789–90.
Id. at 790 (citation omitted).
Id.
See supra note 148.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998).
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The “Child It Wasn’t That Bad and You Didn’t Suffer
Enough” Problem

After proving the harassment was “on the basis of sex,” a
plaintiff bringing a Title IX cause of action for peer-to-peer
harassment must next prove that the harassment was “so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive
the victims of access to educational opportunities or benefits
provided by the school.”225 Courts regularly grant dismissal or
summary judgment because the plaintiff fails to prove that the
harassment was “bad enough”—that is, severe and pervasive—
and/or because the plaintiff fails to prove that he or she “suffered
enough”—that is, deprived of educational access or benefits.
When it comes to the act of harassment, in determining
whether the peer’s conduct rises to the level of actionable
harassment—that is, was bad enough—the Supreme Court was
clear that the Title IX standard would be higher than the Title VII
standard. While the “severe” and “pervasive” language comes
from Title VII hostile work environment caselaw, under Title VII,
an employee need only show the conduct was “severe or
pervasive,”226 whereas for Title IX claims of peer-to-peer
harassment, a student must prove that the harassment was
“severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.” 227 In the context of
Title IX, the Supreme Court adopted a higher standard and “more
rigorous test”228 based on the fact that, in the context of peer-topeer harassment “[school]children may regularly interact in a
manner that would be unacceptable among adults.”229 That is, the
Supreme Court made clear that sex-based conduct that is
unacceptable in an adult workplace could be deemed acceptable,
or, at least, not actionable, in the schoolyard if it was not both
225

Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650

(1999).
226

See, e.g., Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 267, 268 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted) (“There is no minimum number of incidents required to
establish a hostile work environment. That is because ‘harassment need not be both
severe and pervasive to impose liability; one or the other will do.’ ”); Morris v. City of
Colo. Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 664 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added)
(holding Title VII hostile work environment claim exists when harassment is shown
to be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.”).
227
Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (emphasis added).
228
Riccio v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226–27 (D. Conn. 2006)
(“In Davis, the Supreme Court cautioned that peer-on-peer sexual harassment is
subjected to a more rigorous test than employee harassment claims under Title VII.”).
229
Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.
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severe and pervasive.230 This means the scope of peer-based sexual
conduct that a school must respond to is narrower under Title IX
than under Title VII.
When it comes to the impact, under Title IX a plaintiff must
show the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”231 At
first glance, this seems analogous to Title VII, where a plaintiff
must show that “the harassment affected a term, condition, or
privilege of employment.”232 However, under Title IX, courts are
granting motions to dismiss or summary judgment when there is
egregious harassment—harassment that is deemed “severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive”233—because the impact is not
sufficient.234 That is, courts are holding that if a student cannot
prove she or he personally suffered enough, then the conduct—no
matter how bad or egregious it was—is not actionable. Thus, the
resilient victim—one who is the victim of severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive conduct but manages to nevertheless
succeed—will have her or his cause of action dismissed.
1.

The Playground: Lower Courts Are Limiting the Scope of
Actionable Harassment by Dismissing the Conduct, the
Injury, or Both

In the context of Title IX, a review of the caselaw shows that
lower courts are limiting the scope of actionable harassment by
dismissing cases either on the conduct of the harasser or the
impact of the harassment on the victim—even in cases with
egregious facts that certainly warrant a jury determination on the
issue.
For example, in Leffler ex rel. Leffler v. Memphis City School
Board of Education, an elementary school male student told a
female classmate, “I want to put my dick in your pussy,” and he

230

Id. at 653 (“By limiting private damages actions to cases having a systemic
effect on educational programs or activities, we reconcile the general principle that
Title IX prohibits official indifference to known peer sexual harassment with the
practical realities of responding to student behavior, realities that Congress could not
have meant to be ignored.”).
231
Id. at 650 (emphasis added).
232
Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 632 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted).
233
Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
234
See Stuart, 217 F.3d at 631–33; Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–
23 (1993).
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physically “rubbed her” on two occasions, once while in class and
once in the library.235 The evidence showed that the female student
began bringing home Fs on her homework assignments, had
trouble concentrating in school, and “complain[ed] of a different
ailment each day to avoid going to school.”236 The Leffeler court—
granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment—held
that such conduct “did not amount to sexual harassment under
Title IX.”237 The court said the conduct was “clearly offensive,” but
“not sufficiently severe or pervasive to amount to a violation of
Title IX” and explained it could be,
distinguished from the facts in Davis, where the Supreme Court
found that a girl had been subjected to a sexually hostile
environment when a male student, over a period of five months,
attempted to touch the girl’s breasts and genital area, made
vulgar statements, placed a door stop in his pants while acting in
a sexually suggestive manner, and rubbed his body against her
in the hallway.238

The court explained that, in contrast to Davis, the plaintiff here
“was only subjected to one vulgar statement and offensive
touching on two occasions over a period of two weeks.”239 This was
supposedly the court “[v]iewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the [p]laintiffs” and “tak[ing] as true” the plaintiffs’
allegations. 240
In Hawkins v. Sarasota County School Board, an eight-yearold male “would cross his hands, gesture to his genitals, and tell
[female classmates] to ‘suck it’ ” and would “hold two fingers up”
to indicate to “meet me in bed in two seconds.” 241 He would say
“that he wanted to ‘suck [the girls’] breasts till the milk came
out,’ that he wanted [the girls] to ‘suck the juice from his penis,’
and that ‘he wanted [the girls] to have sex with him.’ ” 242 The
evidence showed that “he referred to . . . the girls as ‘sexy baby’
and stated that ‘you have a bun, and I have a hot dog, and I want
to eat them both.’ ”243 “At the playground, he . . . chase[d] the
girls” and attempted “to touch them on their chests” or “kiss them”
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243

No. 04-2141, 2005 WL 2008234, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 2005).
Id. at *2, *4.
Id. at *4, *6.
Id. at *4 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 634).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
322 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id.
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and, “[a]t the bus stop, he” sometimes “grab[bed one of the girls]
and look[ed] up her skirt,” or “rub[bed]” up against her.244 The
harassed “girls stated that this conduct took place over a period of
several months.”245 The court found that “the conduct alleged was
persistent, continuing to occur on a frequent basis for several
months”; “included sexually explicit and vulgar language and acts
of objectively offensive touching”; and, “[a]lthough neither the
perpetrator nor the victims fully understood its ramifications, the
harassment was unwelcome and intimidating.”246
Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment because
“[e]ven assuming that the behavior was severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive, it was not so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it had the systemic effect of denying the
girls equal access to education.”247 The court held that the
evidence—which showed that the girls “cried more frequently,
appeared anxious, and were reluctant to go to school” and further,
that some of the girls even “faked being sick in order not to go to
school”—“reflect[ed] no concrete, negative effect on either the
ability to receive an education or the enjoyment of equal access to
educational programs or opportunities.”248 The court reasoned
that there was not a sufficient injury because “none of the girls’
grades appeared to suffer,” the teachers did not observe a change
in the girls classroom behavior, and although the girls “testif[ied]
that they were upset about the harassment”—some “upset”
enough to fake sickness to avoid school—they were “not [upset]
enough to tell their parents until months after [the harassment]
began.”249
In Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, Illinois School
District, an elementary school girl, age 5, stated that a boy was
“bothering” her at the start of school in August and by September
“became reluctant to go to school,” was “crying at the door when it
was time to go,” and “began wetting her bed and having
nightmares around this time.”250 By October, the teachers saw the

244

Id.
Id.
246
Id. at 1288.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 1281, 1289.
249
Id.
250
163, 315 F.3d 817, 818 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Pahssen ex rel. v. Merrill Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 360, 363 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that three separate
occasions of sexual harassment—a male student shoving a female student into a
245
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boy jump on the plaintiff, lean against her with his hands on his
crotch, unzip his pants on more than one occasion in front of the
class, put his hands down another girl’s pants during story time,
and kiss classmates at recess.251 The plaintiff’s father testified
that his daughter told him that the boy touched her on the “private
parts, chest.”252 The plaintiff was later taken to her pediatrician
for “bedwetting, insomnia, nightmares, and loss of appetite” and
was “diagnosed . . . with acute stress disorder and separation
anxiety due to [the boy’s] behavior toward her.”253 As a result, the
school district granted a request for her to be transferred to a
different school.254 However, the court held the conduct did not
have a “ ‘concrete, negative effect’ on the victim’s education.”255
The court gave examples of what may have a “negative impact on
access to education,” such as “dropping grades,” “becoming
homebound or hospitalized due to harassment,” or “physical
violence.”256 The court held that “there [was] no evidence that [the
plaintiff] was denied access to an education” because “[a]lthough
she was diagnosed with some psychological problems, the record
shows that her grades remained steady and her absenteeism from
school did not increase.”257
Leffler, Hawkins, and Gabrielle all involved facts that are
difficult for an ordinary person to stomach, and all three courts
were presented with the following question: viewing all evidence
in light most favorable to the plaintiffs, could reasonable minds
differ that the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the
school”?258 All three courts—applying Davis—answered in the
negative.

locker, demanding that she perform oral sex on him, and making obscene sexual
gestures at her—was not “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive”).
251
Gabrielle, 315 F.3d at 818–19.
252
Id. at 821.
253
Id. at 820.
254
Id.
255
Id. at 823 (citations omitted).
256
Id. (citations omitted).
257
Id.
258
Leffler ex rel. Leffler v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 04-2141, 2005 WL
2008234, at *1, *4 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 2005); Hawkins v. Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
322 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003); Gabrielle, 315 F.3d at 821–23 (citations omitted).

834

2.

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:793

The Watercooler: Less Egregious Conduct is Permitted and
Employees Are Not Required to Show a Certain Amount of
Suffering to Survive Dismissal of Their Case

In the workplace, actionable sexual harassment is that which
is “severe or pervasive,” meaning “[t]here is no minimum number
of incidents required to establish a hostile work environment.”259
Under the more liberal “severe or pervasive test,” “[h]arassment
need not be both severe and pervasive to impose liability; one or
the other will do.”260 While courts have said “the standard for
establishing that the offending behavior constituted sexual
harassment is rather high,”261 it is undisputed that this standard
is significantly lower than Title IX’s “severe and pervasive”
standard and “requiring harassing conduct to be ‘both severe and
pervasive in order to be actionable imposes a more stringent
burden on the plaintiff than required by law.’ ”262 Under the severe
or pervasive standard, “isolated incidents, if egregious, can alter
the terms and conditions of employment,” whereas “under a
conjunctive standard [severe and pervasive], infrequent conduct,
even if egregious, would not be actionable because it would not be
‘pervasive.’ ”263
When it comes to the impact, in the context of Title VII, a
plaintiff must show that the “harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment.”264 The Supreme Court
explained that “Title VII comes into play before the harassing
conduct leads to a nervous breakdown” because “[a]
discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does
not seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and
often will detract from employees’ job performance, discourage
employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from
advancing in their careers.”265 “The criterion is not what a
259

Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 268 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2000)
(emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
261
Singleton v. Dep’t of Corr. Educ., 115 Fed. Appx. 119, 122 (4th Cir. 2004); see
also Hamel v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cnty., Civ. No. JKB-16-2876, 2018 WL 1453335,
at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2018) (citations omitted) (“In short, the standard for proving a
hostile work environment is intentionally ‘very high’; it is ‘designed to “filter out
complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace.” ’ ”).
262
Guadalajara v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 488, 501 (W.D. Tex. 2016)
(quoting Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns., L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 2005))
(emphasis omitted).
263
Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns., L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 2005).
264
Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 631 (8th Cir.2000).
265
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
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reasonable . . . employee is capable of enduring, but whether the
offensive acts alter the conditions of employment.”266 A plaintiff
“need not show that a campaign of harassment interfered with her
work performance in order to establish a violation of Title VII.”267
In the context of Title VII, harassment that is otherwise actionable
as severe or pervasive is not excused simply because the employee
managed to still perform his or her job adequately—a “plaintiff is
not required to show his work suffered as a result of the
harassment.”268 In this way, an employee is not penalized just
because she is—for whatever reason—able to personally overcome
and manage to maintain her work performance even in face of
harassment. An employee is not required to show a certain
amount of suffering to survive dismissal.269
3.

Without Diverging from Davis or Subjecting School Districts
to Greater Liability, Courts Can Apply Title IX to Better
Protect Children and Encourage School Districts to Be More
Proactive

In interpreting Title IX’s second element, the Supreme Court
in Davis gave lower courts some guidance—guidance that was
later disregarded or misapplied in Leffler, Hawkins, and Gabrielle.
First, it instructed that courts must consider the “constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships,” and
remember that “children may regularly interact in a manner that
would be unacceptable among adults.”270 Second, the Supreme
Court set two floors: (1) ”simple acts of teasing and name-calling
among school children” fall short; and (2) with respect to
deprivation of access to educational opportunities, a “mere ‘decline
in grades is [not] enough to survive’ a motion to dismiss.”271 Third,
the Supreme Court noted that “in theory, a single instance of
sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment could” meet the
standard.272
266

King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1455 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted).
268
White v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., LLC, No. 19-CV-00582, 2019 WL 6052398, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2019).
269
See Dey, 28 F.3d at 1454 (stating that Title VII protects the worker “who
possesses the dedication and fortitude to complete her assigned tasks even in the face
of offensive and abusive sexual banter”); Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
270
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651
(1999) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)).
271
Id. at 652.
272
Id. at 653.
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Without Diverging from Davis, Courts Can Apply Title IX to a
Wider Range of Peer-to-Peer Conduct Constituting “Actionable
Harassment”

Courts should exercise extreme restraint when it comes to
granting summary judgment on the “severe and pervasive”
element of a Title IX peer harassment cause of action. As recently
noted by the Tenth Circuit, “the severity and pervasiveness
evaluation is particularly unsuited for summary judgment
because it is ‘quintessentially a question of fact,’ ” and it is even
less suited for dismissal on the pleadings.273 Problematically,
when courts grant dismissal or summary judgment with respect to
the severe and pervasive element—that is, because the harassers’
conduct was not sufficiently “bad”—it necessarily sends a message
that schools are allowed to ignore such kind of behavior because it
does not rise to the level of “actionable ‘harassment.’ ”274
While the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to protect
school districts from liability or frivolous litigation through the
deliberate indifference standard, noting that “[i]n an appropriate
case, there is no reason why courts, on a motion to dismiss, for
summary judgment, or for a directed verdict, could not identify a
response as not ‘clearly unreasonable’ as a matter of law,”275
“matters of degree—such as severity and pervasiveness—are often
best left to the jury.”276 If courts refrained from granting dismissal
and summary judgment with respect to the harassers’ conduct,
then such conduct would be classified as an actionable act of
harassment, thereby triggering a duty on the school to respond.
Schools would not be overburdened by liability, however, because
Davis instructed that school districts are not going to be held liable
for the peer harassers’ conduct unless the plaintiff shows that the
school district: (1) actually knew about the harassment; and
(2) still responded with deliberate indifference.277 Therefore,
school districts will still escape liability at the dismissal or
summary judgment stage if it can be shown that the school’s
response was not “clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances.” 278 Thus, the upside of courts not granting
dismissal or summary judgment on this element is that schools
273
274
275
276
277
278

O’Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 1999).
Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82).
Id. at 649.
Doe v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 970 F.3d 1300, 1311–12 (10th Cir. 2020).
Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
Id. at 648.
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will be more cognizant to respond to harassment and the downside
is none—a school district can still escape liability because school
administrators “enjoy the flexibility they require” and are deemed
deliberately indifferent only to the extent that their “response to
the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of
the known circumstances.”279
Courts should especially refrain from granting dismissal or
summary judgment with respect to the severe and pervasive
element when the court would already grant summary judgment
as to the third element of plaintiff’s cause of action—deliberate
indifference. By granting summary judgment with respect to the
conduct, the court sends the following message: the conduct the
plaintiff complained of—despite being offensive, vile, and awful—
is not “actionable ‘harassment’ ” and, accordingly, the school
district is not required to address it.280 For example, in Gabrielle,
the majority also granted summary judgment based on the fact
that there was insufficient proof that the school acted with
deliberate indifference.281 Thus, the same result could have been
reached regardless. Likewise, in Leffler, the court would have
reached the same result since it also granted summary judgment
because it found the school did not act with deliberate indifference,
holding “[e]ven assuming that DJ’s conduct amounted to
actionable harassment under Title IX, the Plaintiffs have failed to
show that the Defendant ignored the situation.”282 In Hawkins,
the trial court also granted summary judgment on the element of
deliberate indifference, although, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
did not reach the issue.283
It is also problematic that courts—in granting dismissal or
summary judgment on the harassers’ conduct, that is, the severe
and pervasive element—can be seen as clinging to the “kids will
be kids” or “boys will be boys” rationale to support their
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Id.
Id. at 651 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82
(1998)).
281
Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist., 163, 315 F.3d 817, 824
(7th Cir. 2003).
282
Leffler ex rel. Leffler v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 04-2141, 2005 WL
2008234, at *1, *5 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 2005).
283
Hawkins v. Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“We have therefore decided that the better course is to refrain from answering the
notice and deliberate indifference issues involved in the first question and to rest our
opinion on the denial of access issue.”).
280

838

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:793

decisions.284 Not only that, but courts are excusing the behavior of
the harasser because of his/her age, while at the same time
weaponizing the age of the victim to defeat his/her claim. For
example, in Gabrielle, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the school district, holding that the plaintiff
failed to prove the second Davis element.285 The court explained
that, in determining whether the peer harasser’s conduct was “so
severe, pervasive, and offensive as to create a cause of action under
Title IX,” per Davis, the court needed to take into account the
“obvious fact that young children are still in the process of learning
appropriate behavior.” 286 The court then explained that the peer
harasser’s conduct was “so vague and unspecific that it cannot
provide a basis to determine whether that conduct was severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment.”287 At the same
time, however, the court held the testimony by the five-year-old
plaintiff that the peer harasser did “nasty stuff” or wanted to play
in “funny ways” was akin to “[s]imilar allegations of unarticulated
conduct [that] have been shown to be insufficient to defeat
summary judgment in hostile-work-environment cases.” 288 That
is, the court excused the behavior of the peer harasser because of
his age, but held that the testimony of the child plaintiff should
rise to the level of an adult in a workplace harassment claim. This
double standard is extremely troubling because courts are making
age allowances for children peer harassers, and thereby schools,
but not children victims, effectively “eviserat[ing] the law’s
protective purpose” because if victims “falter at any stage of [the]
reporting process, then they will be unable to access the
protections of Title IX, and schools need not act to protect the
students from nor address their sexual harassment in school.” 289

284
Ann C. McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99,
100 (2018) (“Courts normalize egregious behaviors among boys by opining that ‘boys
will be boys.’ ”); Kelly Dixson Furr, How Well Are the Nation’s Children Protected from
Peer Harassment at School?: Title IX Liability in the Wake of Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, 78 N.C.L. REV. 1573, 1583 (2000) (“Courts frequently have
encountered difficulty in defining student-on-student sexual harassment and in
evaluating the harm and liability in such cases because of students’ immaturity.”).
285
Gabrielle, 315 F.3d at 824.
286
Id. at 822.
287
Id.
288
Id.
289
Emily Suski, The Title IX Paradox, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1147, 1166, 1167 (2020).
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Courts Must Stop Granting Dismissal and Summary
Judgment on the Injury. Period.

Even worse than courts granting dismissal and summary
judgment on the harasser’s conduct, is courts granting dismissal
and summary judgment on the victim’s impact or injury. In the
context of Title IX, courts are holding that children are not
suffering enough to show an effect on their education.290 It is
deeply disturbing that courts are regularly holding that a child’s
suffering, even when looked at in “the light most favorable to the
[child]” and resolving all doubts in favor of the child,291 does not
rise to the level of creating an issue of fact as to whether it had a
concrete, negative effect on his or her education.292 In Gabrielle, a
five-year-old girl—who did not want to go school, started wetting
the bed, could not sleep, could not eat, and was “diagnosed . . . with
acute stress disorder and separation anxiety due to [the boy’s]
behavior toward her”—was held to not have had her education
affected in a concrete, negative way.293 Why? Because, according
to the Seventh Circuit, her grades did not drop.294 This raises an
obvious question: do kindergarteners even have grades?
(1) Courts Need to Take into Account the Age of the Victim in
Determining Whether She Was Deprived of an Educational
Opportunity or Benefit
Although courts regularly consider the harassers’ age in
determining whether his conduct was “severe and pervasive,”
courts are not similarly considering the victim’s age in
determining whether the harassers’ conduct had a concrete,
negative effect on the victim. Gabrielle was a stark example of
this. As noted by Justice Rovner in Gabrielle, grades not dropping
in kindergarten should not ever be “dispositive” of a Title IX cause

290

Roe v. Northeastern Univ., No. CV No. 16-03335-C, 2019 WL 1141291, at *20
(Mass. Super. Mar. 8, 2019) (“Plaintiff’s claimed psychological discomfort alone will
not suffice to trigger a Title IX violation.”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., No. 15
CV 5018, 2019 WL 3554207, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2019) (“Doe’s emotional and
psychological suffering is not concrete enough to show that he was denied equal access
to education.”).
291
See Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2016)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
292
Walker, supra note 27, at 112 (describing the “disturbing trends in post-Davis
litigation” of questioning victim’s allegations at the dismissal and summary judgment
stage).
293
Gabrielle, 315 F.3d at 820, 823.
294
Id. at 823.
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of action given that “[c]ertainly at the kindergarten level, where
learning social skills is at least as important as academic
instruction, grades do not tell the complete story of how well a
student is doing.”295 In Gabrielle, despite maintaining her grades,
the record “readily support[ed] the inference that Gabrielle
suffered a psychological injury as a result of the harassment, an
injury that not only made her reluctant to attend school but
ultimately required months of psychotherapy to address.”296 In
Hawkins, eight-year-old girls “cried more frequently, appeared
anxious, . . . were reluctant to go to school,” and “faked being
sick . . . in order not to go to school,” but were held to not have had
their education effected in a concrete, negative way.297 Again,
why? The court reasoned it was because they did not tell their
parents right away.298 However, it is a well-known fact that young
victims are reluctant to speak of or report sexual harassment or
abuse.299 Because there is no “normal” response when it comes to
sexual harassment or abuse, “[c]ourts cannot expect that children
will be as willing or able to report sexual abuse and harassment
as adults in the workplace.”300 Yet, courts are doing just that and,
worse, courts are expecting more of children than adults—children
must have more suffering, suffering of a specific kind, and more
particularized reporting.301 “Courts have thus established a

295
296
297

Id. at 828 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 829.
Hawkins v. Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1281, 1289 (11th Cir.

2003).
298

Id. at 1289.
Ali Davison, Note, Shackled and Chained in the Schoolyard: A New Approach
to Schools’ Section 1983 Liability Under the Special Relationship Test, 19 CARDOZO
J.L. & GENDER 273, 289 (2012); see also Alexandra Emily Bochte, The Double-Edged
Sword of Justice: The Need for Prosecutors to Take Care of Child Victims, 35 CHILD.’S
LEGAL RTS. J. 200, 211 (2015) (“[T]here are numerous reasons why a child may not
disclose abuse immediately.”); Christopher Uggen & Heather R. Hlavka, Does
Stigmatizing Sex Offenders Drive Down Reporting Rates? Perverse Effects and
Unintended Consequences, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 347, 352 (2008) (noting that common
reasons for not reporting sexual abuse include “embarrassment, shame, stigma, desire
for privacy, fear of being blamed for the assault, fear of retaliation, fear of disrupting
friends and/or family, distrust of the criminal justice system, and . . . a desire to
protect the offender and others”).
300
Does 1,2,3,4 v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 969 F. Supp. 1264, 1282 (M.D. Ala.
1997).
301
Suski, supra note 289, at 1151 (“[C]ourts require children to not only make the
decision to report their sexual harassment but also to do so in unrealistically precise
ways.”).
299

2021] WATERCOOLER IS SAFER THAN THE SCHOOLYARD

841

paradox for students, requiring them to do the nearly impossible
in order to find protection under Title IX.”302
In Title VII cases, courts do not require a plaintiff to show that
the harassment “interfered with her work performance” and a
victim’s ability to do her job in spite of the harassment is not
dispositive.303 In the context of Title IX, “courts ought to be more
flexible in assessing the harms that a child experiences as a result
of harassment, given that children (especially young children) are
far less able to articulate the fact and extent of their injuries and
may manifest an array of different reactions to the harassment.”304
“[W]hat students put up with, without objection or protest, does
not mark the bounds of permissible classroom conduct.”305
Requiring children to “run a gauntlet of sexual abuse” “in return
for the privilege of being” allowed to have an education is in a
word: unacceptable.306 Dismissing a victim’s Title IX cause of
action because the victim was resilient and managed to overcome
the sexual harassment, “turns Title IX on its head.”307
While perhaps it is understandable that in an educational
environment where “students are still learning how to interact
appropriately with their peers”308 a more rigorous severe and
pervasive test is necessary to limit the scope of actionable conduct,
there is no rational reason why a greater injury should be required
in the educational environment than the workplace. Of all the
problems of Title IX’s application by courts, this one seems to be
the easiest to fix and also the problem in most dire need of fixing.
In the context of Title VII and adults in the workplace, courts
recognize that “[a] discriminatorily abusive work environment,
even one that does not seriously affect employees’ psychological
well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or
302

Id. at 1152.
Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1455 (7th Cir. 1994).
304
Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, IL. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 828
(7th Cir. 2003) (Rovner, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
305
Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 749 (2d Cir. 2003).
306
See Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir.1982) (“[A] requirement
that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of
being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as
the harshest of racial epithets.”).
307
Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 706 (4th Cir. 2007) (Gregory, J.,
concurring).
308
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651
(1999); see also Riccio v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226–27 (D.
Conn. 2006).
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keep them from advancing in their careers.”309 Likewise, and even
more in a school setting, the “mere presence of sexual harassment”
by peers “undermines the very educational process that is
supposed to occur in school.”310 While no victim’s manifestation of
their suffering is uniform, it is well-established that peer sexual
harassment can cause low self-esteem, anxiety, inability to
concentrate, depression, and psychosomatic symptoms such as
headaches, change in appetite, and insomnia—all of which can
seriously affect a student’s learning. 311
(2) Courts’ Misapplication of the Dismissal and Summary
Judgment Standards Is Most Obvious (and Troubling) When
It Comes to the Injury
Courts are necessarily not appropriately applying the correct
standard when they dismiss or grant summary judgment based on
the injury, even though “[c]onstruing the record favorably to [the
victim], one may readily infer that the alleged harassment
traumatized her psychologically.”312 For example, in Doe ex rel.
Doe v. Chicago Board of Education, the court held that a
kindergarten boy “subjected to being pantsless in a bathroom with
other exposed boys, an attempted kiss, an incidence of unspecified
‘sexual contact,’ and an exchange of ‘kisses’ on his and his
classmate’s penises” was sufficient to be deemed “sufficiently
severe and offensive.”313 Nevertheless, the court granted summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to “point[] to any
evidence that the conduct at issue had a ‘concrete, negative effect’
on his education.”314 The evidence in that case showed that, as a
result of harassment, the victim’s “behavior changed—he had
emotional outbursts and physical confrontations at school, and he
was angry and destructive at home”; he said “he no longer wanted
to live”; and he “sometimes asked to stay home from school because

309

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
Tianna McClure, Boys Will Be Boys: Peer Sexual Harassment in Schools and
the Implications of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 12 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 95, 104, 105 (2001).
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Stacy M. Chaffin, The New Playground Bullies of Cyberspace: Online Peer
Sexual Harassment, 51 HOW. L.J. 773, 782–83 (2008); Giampetro-Meyer, supra note
140, at 304–05; Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA W.L.J. 85, 97 (1992).
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Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, IL. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 828–
29 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rovner, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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he did not feel safe.”315 Surely, this evidence—which must be
taken as true and all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor316—
is sufficient to allow a jury to infer that the victim was deprived of
educational opportunities. Indeed, the court admitted that “[o]ne
might argue that a reasonable jury could infer that Doe’s
emotional disturbance resulted from the sexual harassment he
suffered and that it shows his education was concretely and
negatively harmed.” 317
Nevertheless, relying on Gabrielle, the court held that “Doe’s
emotional and psychological suffering is not concrete enough to
show that he was denied equal access to education” because he
“participated in school activities, maintained his grades, and
improved his attendance record.”318 Thus, the court essentially
admitted that a genuine dispute of material fact existed, that is,
“reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” 319
yet still granted summary judgment.320 In stark contrast to Title
VII, where courts do not require a certain amount or kind of
suffering by the employee,321 in the context of Title IX some courts
require not only suffering but suffering that fits into a cookiecutter mold. What’s worse is that the court’s holding was entirely
unnecessary—the same result could have been reached regardless
if the court also granted summary judgment on deliberate
indifference.322 After dismissing the injury of the kindergarten
victim, in the next paragraph the court wrote: “In any event, the
Board’s response to R.O. and Doe’s conduct was not ‘clearly
unreasonable.’ ”323
Similarly, in Roe v. Pennsylvania State University, the lower
court granted a motion to dismiss on the injury in a case involving
a female victim who was raped without a condom while
unconscious.324 As a result of the rape, she missed a week of
315
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See id. at *1.
317
Id. at *4.
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citations omitted).
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Doe ex rel. Doe, 2019 WL 3554207, at *6.
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See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); see also 1 W. (FIRM),
HR SERIES FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 9:32 (2021) (“If the environment
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance or is intimidating,
offensive, or hostile, it is irrelevant whether it also causes the victim to suffer
psychological harm.”).
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classes for medical treatment, had to take HIV medication which
caused her not to pass a physical exam needed for her military
career, and had “nightmares, trouble trusting others, and anxiety
when alone.”325 In response to her Title IX cause of action, the
university filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on three elements:
(1) actual knowledge; (2) deliberate indifference; and (3) that “she
was effectively barred equal access to an educational opportunity
or benefit.”326 The court decided not to discuss the first two
arguments because it held it was “clear” the victim failed to allege
deprivation of access.327 The court explained that, while the victim
was required to take HIV medication as a result of the rape, she
failed to “provide any nexus between her military career and a
Penn State educational benefit or opportunity.”328 Additionally,
the court held that while she missed class, she failed to show that
it affected her ability to learn or her grades and that “some
psychological problems” suffered by the victim were an insufficient
injury to support an actionable Title IX claim.329 Incredibly, the
Roe court claimed that—in dismissing the victim’s claim at the
12(b)(6) stage on the injury—it was “by no means downplay[ing]
the significant effect that sexual assault has on individuals” or the
“enormous amounts of pain” endured.330 However, isn’t that
exactly what these courts are doing? They are dismissing away
the real, concrete, negative effects of sexual harassment and
assault. Indeed, they are “downplay[ing] the significant effect that
sexual assault has on individuals.” 331
IV. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE AND THE “BUT WE NEED TO
PROTECT THE SCHOOLS” NON-PROBLEM
What about schools? Do we need to worry about protecting
them from liability? The deliberate indifference standard in Davis
was adopted to do just that. Not only does it protect schools from
liability—thereby negating the need for courts to dismiss cases on
the other Davis elements—courts are interpreting the standard to
effectively immunize schools from liability. For a school to be
liable, a plaintiff must meet the difficult burden of proving a school

325
326
327
328
329
330
331

Id. at *8.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. (citations omitted).
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See id.
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district’s actual knowledge of sexual harassment followed by a
deliberately indifferent response.332 The Supreme Court made
clear that “the school authorities whom we must trust to care for
and educate our children are held to a much lower standard than
employers who permit hostile work environments to occur.”333
While under Title VII, employers are liable for their negligence
when they “knew or should have known” of sexual harassment and
failed to address it,334 under Title IX a school’s “negligent, lazy,
[and] careless” response to known sexual misconduct is not
sufficient to trigger liability.335
It is without doubt that the Supreme Court in Davis was
greatly concerned with not imposing “sweeping liability” on
schools under Title IX for peer-to-peer harassment.336 It is also
without a doubt that the policy under Title IX is to protect students
from discrimination and harassment on the basis of sex. However,
the effect of Davis, and particularly the way the deliberate
indifference standard has been interpreted, has practically
insulated schools from liability under Title IX for peer-to-peer
harassment. Put another way, the pendulum has swung too far in
favor of protecting schools from liability, and it is time for courts
to balance it. Under Davis, courts can and should do both—protect
students and protect schools. Justice Kennedy aptly noted in his
dissenting opinion: “The majority does not explain how a school is
supposed to discern from this mishmash of factors what is
actionable discrimination. Its multifactored balancing test is a far
cry from the clarity we demand of Spending Clause legislation.” 337
This Part argues that in applying the deliberate indifference
standard courts have set the bar far too low for what is “not clearly
unreasonable,” which has had the effect of insulating schools from
332
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646–47
(1999); Jennifer James, We Are Not Done: A Federally Codified Evidentiary Standard
Is Necessary for College Sexual Assault Adjudication, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1321, 1327
(2016) (“Needing to prove ‘actual knowledge’ of the assault and a ‘deliberately
indifferent’ response creates a high, difficult burden for plaintiffs to establish a
violation of Title IX, leaving a defendant-university with a greater likelihood to prevail
on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.”).
333
Ann C. McGinley, Schools as Training Grounds for Harassment, 2019 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 171, 209 (2019).
334
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998).
335
Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Oden v. N. Marianas Coll., 440 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006)); Lossmann
v. Sage Int’l Sch. of Boise, 810 Fed. App’x 577, 578 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Karasek,
956 F.3d at 1108).
336
Davis, 526 U.S. at 652.
337
Id. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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liability—and therefore responsibility—as long as the schools did
more than nothing. This was not the intention of Davis and—
especially in the #MeToo world—it is time for courts to redefine
“clearly unreasonable” to raise the bar, even if slightly, so that
schools will better protect students from and respond to peer
sexual harassment.
A.

Courts Require Children to Report Sexual Harassment in
Unrealistic, Age-Inappropriate Ways

Before even getting to the deliberate indifference standard,
schools are shielded from liability by the actual knowledge
standard where “courts require children to not only make the
decision to report their sexual harassment but also to do so in
unrealistically precise ways.”338 In the #MeToo world especially,
we know that the prevalence of false reporting of sexual assault or
harassment is low.339 Yet, under Title IX, courts are granting
dismissal if the victim does not report the harassment at the right
time, with the right amount of detail, and to the right person.340
For example, a child reporting sexual harassment or assault to a
guidance counselor, coach, security officer, or even a teacher has
been held insufficient to trigger actual knowledge for Title IX
liability.341 Then, assuming a child reports the sexual harassment
to the right person, courts will still dismiss claims under the actual
knowledge requirement if the detail provided to the school is
deemed insufficient.342 For example, in Gabrielle, the Seventh

338

Suski, supra note 289, at 1151.
NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR., FALSE REPORTING OVERVIEW
(2012), https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/2012-03/Publications_NSVRC
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340
See e.g., Warren ex rel. Good v. Reading Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d 163, 173–75 (3d
Cir. 2002) (finding that the school guidance counselor was not the “appropriate
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Couch, 843 F. Supp. 2d 894, 914 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (concluding that the fifth grade
teacher and football coaches were not appropriate persons); Plamp v. Mitchell Sch.
Dist. No. 17-2, 565 F.3d 450, 457–58 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that the school guidance
counselor and high school teachers were not appropriate persons); Ross v. Univ. of
Tulsa, 859 F.3d 1280, 1289–90(10th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the conclusion that the
campus security officers were appropriate persons); G.D. ex rel. A.D. v. Lansing United
Sch. Dist. #469, No. 2:18-CV-02243-HLT, 2018 WL 5724042, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 1,
2018) (granting motion to dismiss because the teacher who oversaw study hall was
not the appropriate person); Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, IL. Sch. Dist.
163, 315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the victim’s testimony was too
“vague and unspecific” to establish actual knowledge).
341
See Warren ex rel. Good, 278 F.3d at 173–175.
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See Suski, supra note 289, at 1151.
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Circuit held that the kindergartner girl’s testimony about her
classmate “bothering” her, doing “nasty stuff,” and wanting to play
in “funny ways” at recess was too “vague and unspecific” to
establish actual knowledge, as was the victim’s father’s testimony
that the student touched the victim’s “[p]rivate parts, chest”
because it did not “present details of when, where, or how often
this alleged conduct occurred and whether it was reported.”343 In
Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School District, the
Tenth Circuit dismissed the Title IX cause of action of a mentally
disabled, middle school victim who was harassed by boys who
“persistently and continuously pestered her for oral sex” and
coerced her into performing oral sex.344 Although the student
lacked some language skills due to her brain injury and did not
know the word for assault, she did report that “these boys were
bothering me.”345 The court held the school did not have actual
knowledge of the sexual harassment—nor was it required to follow
up on the student’s complaint to determine what “bothering me”
meant.346 As noted by the concurring opinion,
[o]ne would think a trained middle school counselor, faced with a
mildly retarded young student who was severely distressed about
being ‘bothered’ by some boys in her class, would ask the obvious
follow-up question—in what way are they bothering you?—
especially since one of the boys had previously been disciplined
for engaging in sexual harassment.347

Thus, courts are requiring children to provide particularized
information to trigger actual knowledge “without regard for
children’s capacity to provide such information” despite the fact
that “[b]oth behavioral psychology and developmental
neuroscience indicate that children face significant obstacles in
making such complex decisions as to whether to report their
sexual harassment at all, let alone in the particularized ways
required by Title IX jurisprudence.”348 While the Supreme Court
has recognized that “[a] child’s age is far ‘more than a
chronological fact,’ ” and instead, “is a fact that ‘generates
commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception,’ ”349
courts are holding children to unrealistic standards to protect
343
344
345
346
347
348
349

Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 822.
511 F.3d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1119–20.
Id.
Id. at 1127. (McConnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Suski, supra note 289, at 1169.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (citations omitted).
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schools from liability under Title IX, and this is before courts even
reach the deliberate indifference standard.
B.

It Is Time We Redefine “Clearly Unreasonable”

Assuming the plaintiff has shown the school had actual
knowledge of the severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
sexual harassment, the plaintiff still must jump through the final,
most difficult hoop: proving the school responded with deliberate
indifference. All cards are seemingly stacked against finding a
school district liable under the deliberate indifference standard.
This is because to avoid liability all the school must show is that
its response was not “clearly unreasonable.”350 And, when
assessing whether the school district’s response was “clearly
unreasonable,” victims do not have a right to seek a “particular
disciplinary action”; there is no requirement that the school purge
themselves from “actionable peer harassment,” and courts are
instructed to “refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary
decisions made by school administrators.”351 Additionally, Davis
instructed lower courts that “there is no reason” they could not
dismiss a case pre-trial on the deliberate indifference element,352
and this has had the effect of lower courts “repeatedly and
disproportionately” deploying the standard against victim’s
causes, including when the school acted “concededly callous,
incompetent, unresponsive, inept, and inapt.”353
In granting dismissal or summary judgment, lower courts are
hesitant to “second-guess[ ] the disciplinary decisions made by
school administrators,”354 consequently making a victim’s
surviving dismissal or summary judgment next to impossible as
long as a school district did more than nothing in response.355 The
“not clearly unreasonable” floor is so low and the standard so easy
for school districts to satisfy that the school district will be
350
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Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 303, 213 F. Supp. 2d 917, 934 (C.D. Ill.
2002) (“However, this court concludes that this was not a case where the school made
no effort whatsoever to investigate or put an end to reported harassment.”); see also
Susan P. Stuart, Jack and Jill Go to Court: Litigating a Peer Sexual Harassment Case
Under Title IX, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 243, 276–77 (2005) (“Thus, prevailing at the
summary judgment level on this element can be difficult for victim-litigants because
of schools’ discretion in matters of discipline and management.”).
352
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protected from liability even when the school district is “negligent,
lazy, and careless,”356 and its actions are “concededly callous,
incompetent, unresponsive, inept, and inapt.”357 Indeed, the
requirement of a clearly unreasonable response in cases of peer
sexual harassment is such a “high standard” for victims to meet
that it “precludes a finding of deliberate indifference in all but
‘limited circumstances.’ ”358 Predictably, under the deliberate
indifference standard, which “permits a wide margin of tolerance
for sexual abuse,” “overall data on the occurrence of sexual abuse
in schools has not moved an inch.”359
In Davis, the court held the defendant school district acted
with deliberate indifference when—despite knowledge of ongoing
sexual harassment—the school took “no disciplinary action” and
“fail[ed] to respond in any way over a period of five months to
complaints of [the harasser’s] in-school misconduct.”360 While
Davis was clear that the deliberate indifference standard was a
high one and that the facts before it met the deliberate indifference
standard, problematically courts have been misapplying Davis to
hold that any response by the school above no action at all will
suffice to shield the school from liability. The recent Sixth Circuit
case, Foster v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan, is
illustrative of this and the particularly troubling trend toward
making the deliberate indifference standard even more difficult to
establish by using the facts of Davis as the floor.361 In Foster, a
female student was repeatedly sexually assaulted and harassed by
a male student and, despite reporting it the university, the male
harasser continued to repeatedly violate a no-contact order and
sexually harass the victim. 362 In holding that the plaintiff failed
to create a fact-issue with respect to deliberate indifference, the
Sixth Circuit identified the facts of Davis as “add[ing] contour to
the deliberate-indifference standard” and held “[g]auged by these
standards, the University of Michigan did not show deliberate
indifference.”363 As demonstrated by Foster, lower courts are
356
357
358

Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093, 1106 (9th Cir. 2020).
MacKinnon, supra note 118, at 2040–41.
Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty., 982 F. Supp. 2d 641, 654 (D. Md.

2013).
359
360

MacKinnon, supra note 118, at 2040–41.
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 634, 649

(1999).
361
362
363

982 F.3d 960, 965–66 (6th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 962–65.
Id. at 965–66.
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improperly construing Davis to hold that deliberate indifference is
only met when a school does nothing (that is, the facts of Davis
itself) and thereby making schools not only immune from liability
but also excusing schools from protecting students from extremely
hostile situations. Courts, in granting dismissal under the
deliberate indifference standard, are regularly reasoning that
“[t]his is not a situation where a school district learned of a
problem and did nothing.”364 However, while a school’s total
failure to respond to known sexual harassment (the facts of Davis)
is certainly deliberate indifference, “Davis does not stand for the
proposition that any response to sexual harassment—no matter
how lacking—is enough to clear the deliberate indifference bar.”365
While it is important to ensure courts are not creating a
“heavy-handed judicial intrusion into school disciplinary
issues,”366 it cannot be the case that the deliberate indifference
standard is so low that any response by the school will result in a
grant of dismissal or summary judgment under this element—that
is, any response will be determined “not clearly unreasonable as a
matter of law” because “if it was, there would be no need to ask
whether a response was ‘clearly unreasonable.’ ” 367 Therefore, it
is important for courts to define what is “clearly unreasonable” or,
rather, “clearly unreasonable” enough to require a jury to decide
the issue, while being mindful that “[d]eliberate indifference is
more than a mere reasonableness standard that transforms every

364
Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114,1121–22
(10th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Facchetti v. Bridgewater Coll., 175 F.
Supp. 3d 627, 638 (W.D. Va. 2016) (citation omitted) (dismissing the victims’ claim
under deliberate indifference and explaining that the plaintiff’s “allegations of
deliberate indifference pale in comparison to other cases where a plaintiff’s Title IX
claim has survived dismissal or summary judgment. Most often, those cases involved
allegations of complete inaction in the face of known harassment.”).
365
Foster, 982 F.3d at 981 n.8 (Moore, J., dissenting).
366
Doe v. St. Francis Sch. Dist., 694 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Judges must
be sensitive to the effects on education of heavy-handed judicial intrusion into school
disciplinary issues, or heavy-handed administrative intrusion required by judges
interpreting Title IX and other statutes that, along with free-wheeling interpretations
of the speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment, have made education one
of the most heavily regulated American industries. . . . Let us not forget that one
component of academic freedom is the right of schools to a degree of autonomy in the
management of their internal affairs.”) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Barbara A. Lee,
Fifty Years of Higher Education Law: Turning the Kaleidoscope, 36 J.C. & UNIV.
L. 649, 654, 667 (2010).
367
Foster, 982 F.3d at 981 n.8 (Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis ex rel.
LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999)).
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school disciplinary decision into a jury question.”368 To do this,
courts must stop employing the facts of Davis “as the barometer
for deliberate indifference” because “[a] case involving no response
to sexual harassment does nothing to explain the range of actual
responses that a jury could reasonably find clearly unreasonable,
let alone the range of responses that would be not clearly
unreasonable as a matter of law.”369
Even considering that “deliberate indifference will often be a
fact-based question, for which bright line rules are ill-suited,”370
there are three floors that can be safely set at the dismissal and
summary judgment stage.
1.

Courts Should Hold Deliberate Indifference Is a Question for
the Jury When a School Fails to Evaluate the Effectiveness
of Its Response

First, courts should deny dismissal and summary judgment
when the school district’s response meets the so-called Einstein
definition of insanity: “doing the same thing over and over again
and expecting different results.”371 “We have recognized that if an
institution learns that its initial response is inadequate, it may be
required to take further steps to prevent harassment.”372 While
courts should not dictate discipline measures or second guess the
discipline measures the school employs, when the record shows
that the school employed a discipline measure and that discipline
measure failed to quell the harassment, a court should hold that a
rational trier of fact could find it was “clearly unreasonable” to not
employ a different discipline method thereafter.373 That is, when
the school knows the strategies used in the past were ineffective
368

Doe ex rel. Doe. v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447 (D.Conn.2006)
(citation omitted).
369
Foster, 982 F.3d at 981 n.8 (Moore, J., dissenting).
370
Doe ex rel. Doe, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (citation omitted).
371
See Sarah Pruitt, Here Are 6 Things Albert Einstein Never Said, HISTORY (Apr.
7, 2017), https://www.history.com/news/here-are-6-things-albert-einstein-never-said
(last updated Sept. 20, 2018).
372
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 175 (1st Cir. 2007), rev’d
on other grounds, 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
373
Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 966 (D.
Kan. 2005) (denying summary judgment on the ground of deliberate indifference when
in response to harassment that lasted for years “the school rarely took any disciplinary
measures above and beyond merely talking to and warning the harassers. . . . While
the court recognizes that the school was not legally obligated to put an end to the
harassment, a reasonable jury certainly could conclude that at some point during the
four-year period of harassment the school district’s standard and ineffective response
to the known harassment became clearly unreasonable.”).
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but nevertheless decides to “do[ ] the same thing over and over
again,” a court should hold that a rational juror could find that the
school acted “clearly unreasonable.”374
The recent case, S.E.S. ex rel. J.M.S. v. Galena Unified School
District No. 499, is a good example of the court applying the correct
standard and denying summary judgment.375 In J.M.S., the record
showed the school responded to the known harassment through a
variety of methods, including speaking with the parents of the
victim, verbally reprimanding the offending students, engaging in
counseling sessions with the offending students, and, suspending
the offending students when there was physical conduct.376
However, the court held that “the evidence demonstrate[d]
repeated harassment over two years” and that although “[t]he
school district took some action in response to [the] harassment,”
“more harassment continued and in a manner where a reasonable
jury could find the school district knew that its earlier responses
were ineffective to deter the persistent harassment of [the victim],
requiring the school district to do more in light of the
circumstances.”377 This is the right result. Courts should hold that
it is a question for the jury when the evidence shows, despite some
response by the school, persisting harassment and failure to

374

See Pruitt, supra note 371; see also Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231
F.3d 253, 262 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a school acted with deliberate indifference
when the evidence showed that “in numerous instances, [the school district] continued
to use the same ineffective methods to no acknowledged avail. Although ‘talking to
the offenders’ produced no results, Spencer continued to employ this ineffective
method.”); Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 551 F.3d 438, 449 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated
by Foster v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 982 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted) (holding that given that the school district knew that its methods were
ineffective, but did not change those methods, “a reasonable jury certainly could
conclude that at some point during the . . . period of harassment[,] the school district’s
standard and ineffective response to the known harassment became clearly
unreasonable.”); Belcher v. Robertson Cnty., Tenn., No. 3-13-0161, 2014 WL 6686741,
at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 26, 2014) (citations omitted) (“The plan it developed, however,
was not explained to the appropriate persons and recommended a strategy (isolation
or separation) which had not worked in the past. Although the deliberate indifference
standard does not mean the Court can second guess a school’s disciplinary actions, the
Court must act when the school’s response to sexual harassment of students, or lack
thereof, is clearly unreasonable in light of the circumstances.”).
375
446 F. Supp. 3d 743, 803 (D. Kan. 2020).
376
Id.
377
Id. at 803, 806; see also Theno, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (“[T]he court believes
that a rational trier of fact could find the requisite nexus between the lack of the
adequacy of the prior response and later harassment. Consequently, the adequacy of
the school’s response to known acts of harassment is an issue that must be resolved
by the jury.”).
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reevaluate the response’s adequacy.378 That is, “[t]he failure to
undertake different or additional measures where it has become
apparent that the initial approach has proved to be woefully
insufficient supplies a factual basis to permit a finding of
deliberate indifference.”379
Problematically, many courts are granting dismissal and
summary judgment as long as the school did more than nothing
and, if the recent Sixth Circuit Foster case is representative of
what is to come, schools will continue to escape liability as long as
they did more than nothing. To reach these decisions, judges are
improperly weighing the evidence themselves—which is
inapposite to what summary judgment (much less a motion to
dismiss) requires.380 As noted by the Sixth Circuit dissent in
Foster, “[d]enying the [school] summary judgment is a far cry from
concluding ultimately that it acted with deliberate indifference, let
alone that [the plaintiff] has proved she is, in fact, entitled to
damages. It simply represents a judicial determination that the
victim of sexual harassment has raised questions of fact that
should be resolved by the jury, not this court.”381
2.

Courts Should Hold Deliberate Indifference Is a Question for
the Jury When a School Fails to Investigate

Second, courts should hold that dismissal is inappropriate
when the record reveals a failure by the school to properly
investigate.382 From Davis, we know that deliberate indifference
is satisfied when there is “no effort whatsoever . . . to
investigate”;383 however, it cannot be that the bar is so low that
anything above “no effort whatsoever to investigate” will suffice to
shield the school from liability. Rather, even if schools investigate,
investigations that are untimely, do not interview all relevant
witnesses, and do not consider relevant evidence should—at a
378

See, e.g., Theno, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
S.K. v. N. Allegheny Sch. Dist., 168 F. Supp. 3d 786, 802 (W.D. Pa. 2016).
380
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (“[A]t the summary
judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue
for trial.”).
381
Foster v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., 982 F.3d 960, 988–89 (6th Cir. 2020)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
382
S.S. v. Alexander, 143 Wash. App. 75, 104, 177 P.3d 724, 738 (Wash. Ct. App.
2008) (citations omitted) (“An institution’s failure to properly investigate a claim of
discrimination is frequently seen as an indication of deliberate indifference.”).
383
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654
(1999).
379
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minimum—create a fact issue with respect to deliberate
indifference. Courts should hold such a lacking investigation is
something a jury could find to be clearly unreasonable. For
example, in Doe v. Forest Hills School District, the district court
determined that the record did not support the school’s motion for
summary judgment on deliberate indifference even though the
school “did not ignore the complaints or completely fail to act, as
in Davis” because of the school’s “limited investigation into the
initial report of sexual assault.”384 The district court did what all
district courts should do in deciding a motion for summary
judgment—it actually applied the standard.385 The court went
back and forth with the evidence and looked at what a jury could
reasonably conclude based on it.386 For instance, the court
reasoned that the jury “could find that the investigation in its
scope and the delay to ultimate conclusion was clearly
unreasonable and represented deliberate indifference by the
school and administrators” when it failed to interview certain
witnesses, did not follow its own Title IX procedures, and did not
seek certain evidence.387 However, the court also noted that
“[a]lthough the investigation could have been more thorough, a
jury could determine that it was not clearly unreasonable.” 388
In another case, G.C. ex rel. Counts v. N. Clackamas School
District, the district court applied the correct summary judgment
standard and refused to immunize the school against liability just
because it took some action.389 That case involved the sexual
harassment of a special education student by another special
education student, and the school district moved for summary
judgment on deliberate indifference by citing the following
evidence of its response:
(1) the District cooperated with the police and undertook its own
investigation of KW’s [another alleged victim] allegations
against AY [harasser]; (2) the District explored the possibility of
moving AY from the school; (3) the District performed functional
behavioral assessments on AY, KW, and plaintiff; (4) the District
created a plan to place AY on high level line-of-sight supervision,
under which he would never be left unsupervised; (5) The District
instructed AY and plaintiff not to talk about KW’s allegations
384
385
386
387
388
389

No. 1:13-CV-428, 2015 WL 9906260, at *1, *10, *11 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015).
Id. at *10, *11.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11.
654 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1238 (D. Or. 2009).
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with each other and separated them while at school; and (6) the
District modified AY’s IEP to include training on appropriate
interaction with females.390

The court explained that while “[c]learly, these facts show
that the District did not completely fail to act in response to [the]
allegations” and that it was a “close case,” it could not “conclude
that the evidence is such that whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent would not be subject to debate amongst
reasonable jurors.”391 Important to the court’s conclusion was that
“[c]onstruing the inferences created by this evidence in plaintiff’s
favor,” a reasonable juror could find the school’s “investigation was
flawed in some regard” and that the school’s “failure to ensure that
its principal, and its teachers, received training in handling
reports of sex abuse, could be viewed by a reasonable juror as
evidence that the District does not take such allegations with the
seriousness such allegations deserve.”392
Similarly, courts should hold a fact issue is created with
respect to deliberate indifference when there is an investigation
and response—perhaps even a thorough one—but it is
unjustifiably delayed. In Doe ex rel. Doe v. Coventry Board of
Education, while the school district did eventually respond months
after the incident, the court held that the school’s failure to take
disciplinary action for a six-month period could be found by the
jury to be “lengthy and unjustified.”393 Similarly, in Roussaw v.
Mastery Charter High School, the district court found a delay of
thirteen days in which the school “took no action to address the
sexual assault” was “unreasonable under the circumstances.”394
3.

Court Should Hold Deliberate Indifference Is a Question for
the Jury When a School Fails to Train Its Employees

Third, while a school district’s failure to follow Title IX
procedures has been held insufficient to prove deliberate

390

Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1238, 1241.
392
Id. at 1238–39.
393
630 F. Supp. 2d 226, 235 (D. Conn. 2009).
394
No. 19-cv-1458, 2020 WL 2615621, at *6–*7 (E.D. Pa., May 22, 2020); see also
Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007)
(holding that “[t]he fact that the disciplinary panel ultimately decided not to sanction
the alleged assailants is immaterial because it fails to explain why UGA waited almost
eleven months to take corrective action”).
391
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indifference under Title IX in and of itself,395 courts should hold a
fact issue is created with respect to deliberate indifference when a
school district knows it has a sexual harassment problem and fails
to enact any policies to prevent it and/or fails to train its teachers
and staff on preventing sexual harassment. For example, in
Roussaw, the district court held that when the school had actual
knowledge of past sexual incidents among middle school students,
its “failure to institute any policies, procedures, or training
required by Title IX was an unreasonable response.”396 Similarly,
in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Coventry Board of Education, the court held
that when the record was “unclear” as to whether the school had a
policy with respect to a student arrested for sexual assault or, even
if there was a policy, “a jury could find the Defendant’s lack of
enforcement to be unreasonable.”397
Moreover, if we want to “avoid schools as training grounds for
harassment and move toward schools as training grounds for
respect, citizenship, and eliminating harassment,” it is necessary
that schools educate those on the front lines—their teachers and
staff—about how to respond to sexual harassment.398 A school’s
failure to train its teachers and staff about responding to sexual
harassment must be sufficient to trigger a fact issue as to whether
the school’s position, with respect to sexual harassment of its
students, is that of deliberate indifference. For example, the Tenth
Circuit noted that “a school can be liable for an “official
policy . . . of deliberate indifference to providing adequate training
or guidance that is obviously necessary for implementation of a
specific program or policy of the recipient.”399 As put by another
395
Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty., 982 F. Supp. 2d 641, 657 (D. Md.
2013), aff’d, 605 Fed. App’x 159 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’
failure to follow the procedures set forth in AP 4170 displays deliberate indifference.
The salient flaw in this argument is that the Supreme Court has held that the failure
to follow sexual harassment grievance procedures does not prove deliberate
indifference under Title IX.”) (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S.
274, 291–92 (1998)); Greene v. Friendship Pub. Charter Sch., Inc., No. CV 16-00901
(ESH), 2019 WL 918307, at *10 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-7023,
2019 WL 4566283 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2019) (“[A] school’s failure to comply with its
own internal policies does not itself establish deliberate indifference, just as a school’s
failure to comply with federal regulations does not do so.”).
396
Roussaw, 2020 WL 2615621, at *5.
397
630 F. Supp. 2d at 236.
398
McGinley, supra note 333, at 225.
399
Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007); see
also G.C. ex rel. Counts v. N. Clackamas Sch. Dist., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1238–39 (D.
Or. 2009) (The “failure to ensure that [administrators or] teachers, received training
in handling reports of sex abuse, could be viewed by a reasonable juror as evidence
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court, a school’s “failure to ensure that its principal, and its
teachers, received training in handling reports of sex abuse, could
be viewed by a reasonable juror as evidence that the District does
not take such allegations with the seriousness such allegations
deserve.”400
Importantly, in denying dismissal and summary judgment in
these circumstances, courts are not holding that deliberate
indifference is “the only inference to be drawn,” but rather that
deliberate indifference is “one of many” when the court is “required
to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.”401
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT THREATENS TO MAKE EVERYTHING WORSE
AND MUST BE RESOLVED
The deliberate indifference standard is criticized as creating
an immunity-like shield from liability for schools as long as they
do more than nothing in response to peer sexual harassment.402
Therefore, it is extremely troubling that the deliberate
indifference standard will potentially become even more difficult
to satisfy for student-plaintiffs in cases of peer sexual harassment
across the country. Since 2019, there has been a deepening circuit
split403 over whether a student plaintiff must show that a school’s
failure to adequately investigate a sexual assault claim “caused
him to experience any separate harassment following his
assault.”404 The split comes from Davis language regarding
deliberate indifference, which provides:

that the District does not take such allegations with the seriousness such allegations
deserve.”).
400
G.C. ex rel. Counts, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 1238–39.
401
Id.
402
See, e.g., David Ellis Ferster, Deliberately Different: Bullying as a Denial of a
Free Appropriate Public Education Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 43 GA. L. REV. 191, 203 (2008) (“The deliberate indifference standard is criticized
as establishing a barrier to relief from all but unconscionable action or inaction by
school officials.”); David S. Cohen, Limiting Gebser: Institutional Liability for NonHarassment Sex Discrimination Under Title IX, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 311, 315
(2004) (“Gebser and Davis have been widely and justifiably criticized: The holdings of
the two cases unnecessarily thwart Title IX’s purpose by establishing a difficult hurdle
for students who seek to hold an institution liable for sexual harassment that adults
in similar employment situations do not have to overcome. Their holdings also fail to
create an incentive for schools to proactively change and police their agents.”).
403
Compare Farmer v. Kan. State Univ., 918 F.3d 1094, 1102–03 (10th Cir. 2019),
with K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2017), and
Kollaritsch v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 944 F.3d 613, 619–20 (6th Cir. 2019).
404
Rossley v. Drake Univ., 342 F. Supp. 3d 904, 930 (S.D. Iowa 2018).
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If a funding recipient does not engage in harassment directly, it
may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate indifference
“subject[s]” its students to harassment. That is, the deliberate
indifference must, at a minimum, “cause [students] to undergo”
harassment or “make them liable or vulnerable” to it. Random
House Dictionary of the English Language 1415 (1966) (defining
“subject” as “to cause to undergo the action of something
specified; expose” or “to make liable or vulnerable; lay open;
expose”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2275
(1961) (defining “subject” as “to cause to undergo or submit to:
make submit to a particular action or effect: EXPOSE”).405

The question raised by the above Davis language is whether a
school’s purported “deliberate indifference” to known actionable
sexual harassment has to “cause” a plaintiff to suffer further
sexual harassment in order for liability to be imposed, or whether
it is sufficient that a school’s “deliberate indifference” to the
actionable sexual harassment made a plaintiff “vulnerable to”
harassment.406 That is, does a plaintiff have to “allege, as an
element of her Title IX claim, that [a school’s] deliberate
indifference caused her to be subjected to actual further
harassment by a student”?407
A.

The Tenth Circuit: Deliberate Indifference Does Not Require
Further Incidents of Actionable Harassment

In Farmer v. Kansas State University, the Tenth Circuit held
that “[p]laintiffs can state a viable Title IX claim for student-onstudent harassment by alleging that the funding recipient’s
deliberate indifference caused them to be ‘vulnerable to’ further
harassment without requiring an allegation of subsequent actual
sexual harassment.”408 The Farmer case arose from two female
plaintiffs who were raped at a fraternity party. Although the
plaintiffs reported the rape to the university and the university’s
interfraternity council, the school failed to investigate and found
no adverse finding against the fraternity.409 As a result, one
plaintiff “missed classes, struggled in school, secluded herself from
friends, withdrew from KSU activities in which she had previously
taken a leadership role, fell into a deep depression, slept
405

Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644–45

(1999).
406
407
408
409

Farmer, 918 F.3d at 1097.
Id. at 1102.
Id. at 1104 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1099–100.
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excessively, and engaged in self-destructive behaviors such as
excessive drinking and slitting her wrist.”410 The other plaintiff’s
“grades plummeted,” “she lost her academic scholarship,” and she
“exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.”411 The
university filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by the
district court. 412 On appeal, the university argued that, even
accepting that it acted with deliberate indifference, plaintiffs
failed to state a claim because they did not “allege that the
university’s deliberate indifference caused each of them to undergo
further incidents of actual harassment by other students.”413
The Tenth Circuit rejected the university’s argument and held
that “[t]he Supreme Court has already answered the legal
question presented here, ruling, as Plaintiffs allege, that a funding
recipient’s ‘deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, cause
students to undergo harassment or make them liable or vulnerable
to it.’ ”414 The court explained: “It is sufficient for [the plaintiff] to
allege that [the school’s] deliberate indifference made [the
plaintiff] ‘vulnerable to’ sexual harassment” and that “Title IX
does not require a subsequent sexual assault before a plaintiff can
sue.”415 Based on the facts of the case, the court held that the
“Plaintiffs ha[d] sufficiently alleged that KSU’s deliberate
indifference made each of them ‘vulnerable to’ sexual harassment
by allowing their student-assailants—unchecked and without the
school investigating—to continue attending KSU along with
Plaintiffs.”416
The First and Eleventh Circuits have also held that a
requirement of subsequent actionable harassment is inconsistent
with Davis and Title IX.417 While the Ninth Circuit recently
declined to address the split,418 district courts in the Ninth Circuit
410

Id.
Id. at 1101 (cleaned up).
412
Id. at 1101.
413
Id. at 1097 (emphasis added).
414
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644–45 (1999)).
415
Id. at 1103.
416
Id. at 1097.
417
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 172–73 (1st Cir. 2007),
rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (holding that per Davis, “funding
recipients may run afoul of Title IX not merely by ‘caus[ing]’ students to undergo
harassment but also by ‘mak[ing] them liable or vulnerable’ to it.”) (quoting Davis,
526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999)); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d
1282, 1296–98 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that further actionable harassment was not
required).
418
Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093, 1106 n.2 (9th Cir. 2020).
411

860

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:793

have followed the Farmer opinion.419 Similarly, other district
courts across the country have held that, “Title IX does not require
that a defendants’ deliberate indifference lead to subsequent
actionable harassment.”420
B.

The Eighth and Sixth Circuits: Deliberate Indifference Must
Have Caused Further Actionable Harassment

In contrast with the Farmer court, the Eighth and Sixth
Circuits have recently interrupted Davis to require that a school’s
purported deliberate indifference, following the actionable sexual
harassment, cause the student to suffer from additional,
subsequent actionable harassment.421 In K.T. v. Culver-Stockton
College, the plaintiff, who was a junior in high school, visited the
defendant college and was allegedly sexually assaulted at a
fraternity party.422 The plaintiff sued the college under Title IX
and alleged the college acted with deliberate indifference by failing
to investigate the incident or provide her with medical services or
treatment and that, as a result, she suffered “post-trauma
syndrome and psychiatric overlay.”423 The Eighth Circuit, in
affirming the grant of the college’s motion to dismiss, held that the
419
See, e.g., Richardson-Bass v. State Ctr. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 1-19-CV-01566AWI-SAB, 2020 WL 5658225, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2020) (adopting Farmer
holding); Barnett v. Kapla, No. 20-CV-03748-JCS, 2020 WL 6737381, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 28, 2020) (same).
420
Wells v. Hense, 235 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Doe v. Baylor Univ.,
240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 660 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“[T]he discriminatory harm can include
the harm faced by student-victims who are rendered vulnerable to future harassment
and either leave school or remain at school and endure an educational environment
that constantly exposes them to a potential encounter with their harasser or
assailant.”) (citations omitted); Spencer v. Univ. of N.M. Bd. of Regents, No. 15-CV141 MCA/SCY, 2016 WL 10592223, at *6 (D.N.M. Jan. 11, 2016) (“In the context of
Title IX, ‘there is no “one free rape” rule’; and a victim does not have to be raped twice
before the school is required to respond appropriately.”) (quoting S.S. v. Alexander,
177 P.3d 724, 741 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No.
2:15-cv-04418-CAS(SHx), 2015 WL 8527338, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015) (“[I]t is
possible for a plaintiff to bring a Title IX claim against an educational institution even
in the absence of any further affirmative acts of harassment by the alleged harasser
or other students or faculty.”); Takla v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2015 WL 6755190,
at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2015) (citations omitted) (“The Court agrees with plaintiffs
that placing undue emphasis on whether further harassment actually occurred to
gauge the responsiveness of an educational institution would penalize a sexual
harassment victim who takes steps to avoid the offending environment in which she
may again encounter the harasser.”).
421
K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2017); Kollaritsch
v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 944 F.3d 613, 619–20 (6th Cir. 2019).
422
865 F.3d at 1056.
423
Id. at 1058.
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college’s deliberate indifference after the reporting of the sexual
assault could not “be characterized as deliberate indifference that
caused the assault.”424
Similarly, in the 2019 case Kollaritsch v. Michigan State
University Board of Trustees, the Sixth Circuit granted the
university’s motion to dismiss in a lawsuit stemming from
student-on-student sexual assault, by holding that the plaintiff
failed to allege some “further actionable harassment [that] would
not have happened but for the objective unreasonableness
(deliberate indifference) of the school’s response.”425 The Sixth
Circuit went to the extreme of actually “parsing” out the elements
of a Title IX claim into “two separate components, comprising
separate-but-related torts by separate-and-unrelated tortfeasors:
(1) ‘actionable harassment’ by a student, and (2) a deliberateindifference intentional tort by the school.”426 After the studentplaintiff proves there was actionable severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive harassment, the student must next prove
“four elements of a deliberate-indifference-based intentional tort:
(1) knowledge, (2) an act, (3) injury, and (4) causation.”427
Under this four-part “tort,” element one (knowledge) means
that a student must show that the school had actual knowledge of
the actionable harassment; element two (act) means a response by
the school that was “clearly unreasonable” thereby showing
deliberate indifference; and element three (injury) “means the
deprivation of ‘access to the educational opportunities or benefits
provided by the school.’ ”428 These first three “elements” are
familiar, however, the Sixth Circuit’s addition of a new causation
requirement (element four) now demands that “the ‘Act’ caused
the ‘Injury,’ such that the injury is attributable to the post-actualknowledge further harassment, which would not have happened
but for the clear unreasonableness of the school’s response.”429
Thus, the Sixth Circuit requires not only that the plaintiff prove
the school’s response was “clearly unreasonable” (deliberate
indifference), but also that it led “to further harassment,” with “the
critical point [being] that the response must bring about or fail to
424

Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
944 F.3d at 623–24.
426
Id. 619–20 (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 643, 651–52 (1999)).
427
Id. at 621.
428
Id. at 621–22 (first quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 642, 650; then quoting McCoy v.
Bd. of Educ., 515 F. App’x 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2013)).
429
Id. at 622 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 644).
425
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protect against the further harassment.”430 As summarized by the
court:
We hold that the plaintiff must plead, and ultimately prove, an
incident of actionable sexual harassment, the school’s actual
knowledge of it, some further incident of actionable sexual
harassment, that the further actionable harassment would not
have happened but for the objective unreasonableness (deliberate
indifference) of the school’s response, and that the Title IX injury
is attributable to the post-actual-knowledge further
harassment.431

The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari
arising from the Sixth Circuit case.432
C.

Adding a Requirement That Deliberate Indifference Cause
Further Actionable Harassment Would Slam the Title IX
Door Shut on Victims of Peer Harassment

As set forth supra, recovering under Title IX for peer-to-peer
sexual harassment is already exceedingly difficult for victims. If
the Eighth and Sixth Circuit interpretations of the deliberate
indifference standard were adopted, recovery would become
borderline impossible. The Sixth Circuit’s “troubling” addition of
a “but for” causation requirement “runs counter to the goals of
Title IX and is not convincing.”433
First, the Davis court’s use of the word “or” “clearly states
alternate ways a plaintiff may satisfy the [deliberate indifference]
element:”434 “the deliberate indifference must, at a minimum,
‘cause [students] to undergo’ harassment or ‘make them liable or
vulnerable’ to it.”435 As noted by the Tenth Circuit, requiring
subsequent actionable sexual harassment would fail to “give effect
to each part of [the Davis] sentence” by rendering the “or ‘ma[d]e
430

Id.
Id. at 623–24.
432
Kollaritsch v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 141 S.Ct. 554 (2020).
433
Sixth Circuit Requires Further Harassment in Deliberate Indifference Claims
Kollaritsch v. Michigan State University Board of Trustees, 944 F.3d 613 (6th Cir.
2019), 133 HARV. L. REV. 2611, 2617 (2020) [hereinafter Sixth Circuit Requires
Further Harassment] (noting that the “but-for causation standard adopted in
Kollaritsch risks undermining the deterrence objectives of Title IX by setting a
significantly higher bar for student-victims”) (emphasis omitted); Barnett v. Kapla,
No. 20-CV-03748-JCS, 2020 WL 6737381, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2020) (citation
omitted).
434
Barnett, 2020 WL 6737381, at *9–10.
435
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645
(1999) (emphasis added).
431
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them liable or vulnerable’ to it” language superfluous.436
Additionally, the Davis court specifically referred to the definition
of “subject” as including “expose” such that it is sufficient that a
defendant’s deliberate indifference “exposes” a plaintiff to
harassment—that is, makes a plaintiff “vulnerable to sexual
harassment”—as opposed to requiring a plaintiff to prove further
actionable harassment.437
Second, adding a further actionable harassment requirement
“conflat[es] the two analytically separate elements of causation
and injury.”438 Under normal tort principles, a plaintiff must prove
that the defendant’s wrongful act (that is, a school’s deliberate
indifference to known severe and pervasive sexual harassment)
caused the plaintiff’s injury (that is, deprivation of access to
educational opportunities or benefits).439 However, under the
Tenth and Sixth Circuit approaches, a plaintiff must prove that
defendant’s wrongful act (that is, a school’s deliberate indifference
to known severe and pervasive sexual harassment) caused the
plaintiff to suffer not from her injury (that is, deprivation of access
to educational opportunities or benefits) but instead caused
further actionable harassment by a third-party.440 This approach
lacks support not only in Davis, but basic principles of tort law
that link together the defendant’s wrongful act and the plaintiff’s
injury.441
Third, Davis was very clear that a school would be liable “only
for its own misconduct.”442 However, the addition of a further
actionable harassment requirement necessarily means that a
school that was deliberately indifferent to known “severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive” sexual harassment may
nevertheless escape liability because its liability hinges on a
subsequent act of the harasser—that is, another party who is not
the school. This “runs counter to the goals of Title IX and is not
convincing” because “a student must be harassed or assaulted a
second time before the school’s clearly unreasonable response to
the initial incident becomes actionable, irrespective of the
436
Farmer v. Kan. State Univ., 918 F.3d 1094, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2019) (emphasis
omitted) (citations omitted).
437
Id. at 1104 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 645) (cleaned up).
438
Sixth Circuit Requires Further Harassment, supra note 433, at 2617.
439
Dan B. Dobbs et al., Defining Torts, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (2d ed. 2011).
440
K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2017); Kollaritsch
v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 944 F.3d 613, 619–20 (6th Cir. 2019).
441
See Dobbs, supra note 439, § 1.
442
Davis, 526 U.S. at 640.
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deficiency of the school’s response, the impact on the student, and
the other circumstances of the case . . . .”443 For example, if—after
suffering the severe and pervasive sexual harassment that the
school knew about and acted deliberately indifferent in response
to—a plaintiff left school because of the incidents or, worse, died
by suicide there would never be an opportunity for further
actionable harassment by a third-party. Yet, under the Eighth
and Sixth Circuit approaches, the school would escape liability
despite the fact that the lack of further actionable harassment had
nothing to do with the school’s “good” conduct but, instead, was
due to the extreme harm caused by the school’s deliberate
indifference. For example, in Williams v. Board of Regents of
University System of Georgia, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted
by other students, reported the sexual assault to the university,
and “the response to her complaints did nothing to assuage her
concerns of a future attack should she return to [campus].”444 The
plaintiff dropped out of the university because of fear of being
attacked again.445 The court held that the plaintiff had a Title IX
claim because the fact that no further sexual assault occurred had
nothing to do with the university’s response and, instead, the
plaintiff’s decision to withdraw was because of the university’s
deliberate indifference, which “effectively bar[red] [her] access to
an educational opportunity.”446
Also, it is often the case that—after suffering the severe and
pervasive sexual harassment the school knew about and acted
deliberately indifferent in response to—that a plaintiff will take
affirmative steps to avoid further harassment by, for example,
taking a different route in the hallways to avoid her harasser.
“[P]lacing undue emphasis on whether further harassment
actually occurred to gauge the responsiveness of an educational
institution would penalize a sexual harassment victim who takes
steps to avoid the offending environment in which she may again
encounter the harasser.” 447
443
Farmer v. Kan. State Univ., 918 F.3d 1094, 1104 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2015 WL 8527338, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015)).
444
477 F.3d 1282, 1296–98 (11th Cir. 2007).
445
Id. at 1298.
446
Id. at 1296–1298.
447
Karasek, 2015 WL 8527338, at *12; see also Sixth Circuit Requires Further
Harassment, supra note 433, at 2617 (noting that “the but-for causation standard
adopted in Kollaritsch risks undermining the deterrence objectives of Title IX by
setting a significantly higher bar for student-victims”).
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Finally, the Eighth and Sixth Circuit approaches run afoul not
only to common sense, but the very heart of Title IX, which
includes “protecting individual students against discriminatory
practices.”448 “The statute makes clear that, whatever else it
prohibits, students must not be denied access to educational
benefits and opportunities on the basis of gender.”449 Therefore,
the proper reading of Davis and the deliberate indifference
requirement is that Title IX liability “derives from the school’s
deliberate indifference to known student-on-student sexual
harassment, which leaves victims vulnerable to additional
harassment,” or, put another way, Title IX liability should be
imposed when “a school’s inadequate response creates a hostile
environment that deprives victims of the school’s educational
opportunities and benefits.”450 As put by one court, “[i]n the
context of Title IX, ‘there is no “one free rape” rule’; and a victim
does not have to be raped twice before the school is required to
respond appropriately.”451 However, by adding a requirement of
further actionable harassment, the Eighth and Sixth Circuits
incorrectly adopt a “one free rape” rule in the context of peer
harassment. Namely, following K.T. and Kollaritsch, if a student
was raped by another student and the school knew about it and
responded with deliberate indifference, the student could not
recover unless she subsequently suffered further actionable
harassment.452 Yet, Davis was clear that “a single instance of peeron-peer harassment theoretically might form a basis for Title IX
liability if that incident were vile enough and the institution’s
response, after learning of it, unreasonable enough to have the
combined systemic effect of denying access to a scholastic program
448

Farmer, 918 F.3d at 1104 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704
(1979)).
449
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650
(1999).
450
Doe 1 v. Howard Univ., 396 F. Supp. 3d 126, 135 (D.D.C. 2019), motion to
certify appeal granted, reconsideration denied, No. 17-CV-870 (TSC), 2019 WL
4860717 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2019) and appeal dismissed, No. 19-7163, 2020 WL 2611030
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 2020) (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 650).
451
Spencer v. Univ. of N.M. Bd. of Regents, No. 15-CV-141, 2016 WL 10592223,
at *6 (D.N.M. Jan. 11, 2016) (quoting S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 741 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2008)); see also Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. 3:01-CV-1591, 2003 WL 1563424, at *3
(D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003) (explaining that “a reasonable jury could conclude that
further encounters, of any sort, between a rape victim and her attacker could create
an environment sufficiently hostile to deprive the victim of access to educational
opportunities provided by a university”).
452
K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2017); Kollaritsch
v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 944 F.3d 613, 619–20 (6th Cir. 2019).
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or activity.”453 Thus, not only is a “one free rape” rule contrary to
Title IX policy, but it is also explicitly negated by Davis itself.
CONCLUSION
In a recent Title VII hostile work environment case, the
plaintiff invoked the #MeToo movement in an attempt to support
his claim.454 The court was quick to dismiss the plaintiff’s
“frivolous argument,” holding that “no Court in the country, let
alone in this Circuit, has suggested that the #MeToo Movement
alters the scope of Title VII.”455 While that may technically be
true—that the #MeToo movement does not alter the scope of Title
VII or Title IX—it is also true that the #MeToo movement has had
radiating effects on not only public opinion, but the legal landscape
itself. For example, states have passed laws banning the use of
non-disclosure agreements in sexual misconduct cases,456 and have
expanded sexual harassment to cover independent contractors.457
When it comes to children and sexual harassment in schools, in
the #MeToo world, there is no justification for lower courts
interpreting Davis’ already high standard to be even more difficult
to satisfy and simultaneously misapplying what should be a
favorable standard at the motion to dismiss and summary
judgment stage to dispose of victims’ cases before they even reach
a jury. Because of the lower courts’ overly strict interpretation of
Davis, students are being forced to “accept [sexual harassment] as
part of everyday life” in schools,458 and if the Supreme Court were
to resolve the circuit split by requiring further actionable
harassment, more than ever children would have to “run a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed

453
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 172–73 (1st Cir. 2007),
rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at
652–53) (“Although, in theory, a single instance of sufficiently severe one-on-one peer
harassment could be said to have such [a systemic] effect, we think it unlikely that
Congress would have thought such behavior sufficient to rise to this level in light of
the inevitability of student misconduct and the amount of litigation that would be
invited by entertaining claims of official indifference to a single instance of one-on-one
peer harassment.”).
454
Hardwick v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-01161-JMS-DML, 2018 WL
4620252, at *15 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2018).
455
Id.
456
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1001.
457
S.B. 6577, 2019-2020 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
458
See LIPSON, supra note 37, at 13.
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to” have an education.459 The time for change is well-past due, but
now is better than never; otherwise, we will risk having a whole
new generation saying #MeToo.

459
See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir.1982) (“[A]
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.”).

